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This dissertation is a two-essay study on globalization, sourcing structure and product 
quality and firm performance in global supply chain management. In the first essay, 
using a unique archival dataset on firms and their suppliers, the role of supply chain 
strategies in contributing to product safety and quality, as assessed through product 
recalls are investigated. The second essay investigates the relationship between 
product recalls and firm performance.  Moreover, the moderating effects on the 
recall-profitability relationship of supply chain as well as recall management 
strategies are investigated  
Essay 1 investigates how a number of supply chain strategies contribute to 
product recalls.  In particular, I examine how the make or buy decision (i.e., 
outsourcing), the decision to concentrate the supply base (i.e., use few vs. several 
  
suppliers), the use of foreign suppliers (i.e., offshoring), and the extent of global 
operations, contribute to product recalls. The subject area of product quality and 
safety failures leading to product recalls is important because product recalls can have 
a major, negative impact on firm performance.  For example, in the event of a product 
recall, replacement orders may need to be shipped, new suppliers may need to be 
found and vetted, and marketing expenditures may need to be made to counter 
negative publicity from the recall. Applying key theories in operations and supply 
chain management, I find that firms vary greatly in recall propensity and that these 
variations are related to heterogeneity in outsourcing, offshoring, and supply base 
concentration.  
In the second essay, I revisit the recall-performance relationship.  First, I investigate 
the relationship between product recalls and profitability.  Firms may choose to try to 
avoid product recalls by increasing their expenditures on product quality and 
inspection services.  Or, on the other hand, they may emphasize short term 
profitability by reducing production and inspection costs, thereby increasing the risk 
of incurring a product recall. Since firms are expected to balance production and 
quality inspection costs against the costs associated with product recalls in order to 
maximize profit performance, the recall-profitability relationship is not clear, a priori.  
I further investigate the moderating effect of global operations, supply base structure 
and recall strategies on the relationship between product recalls and profit margins. 
My theory-based research suggests a curvilinear recall-profit relationship and that this 
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This dissertation links globalization, sourcing structure and product quality and firm 
performance in global supply chain management. Globalization, both sourcing and 
markets, has been a popular business strategy within the last two decades. At the 
same time, product recalls are, according to both media and research sources, on the 
rise (Hora et al., 2011). The Consumer Product Safety Commission’s (CPSC) 
recordings of recalls have doubled, both in the number of announcements and 
affected products, over the past ten years. In fact, according to Marucheck et al., 
(2011), the most globalized industries make the most recalls.  
Globalization of firms and its relationship to performance has been of central 
interest in global strategy studies for a long time but has recently garnered heightened 
interest (e.g. Qian et al., 2010; Rawley, 2010; Hitt et al., 2006; Lu et al., 2001). Many 
globalization studies, spanning three decades and across several disciplinary 
boundaries, focused primarily on the effects of diversification on firm financial 
performance (e.g. Morck and Yeung, 1991; Tallman and Li, 1996; Delios and 
Beamish, 1999; Tallman and Yip, 2009; Qian et al., 2010; Kirca et al., 2011 etc.). 
Several studies, alluding to several management theories like organization learning 
theories, a resource based perspective and transaction cost economics, have looked 
into the linkages between global strategies, both sourcing and sales, and performance, 
albeit with different empirical findings (example Hitt et al., 2006). These studies 
have, however, largely ignored the supply chain implications and product quality and 
safety risks of globalization on internationally diversified firms. Indeed, even though 




environment is getting more turbulent and prone to disruptions (Li and Tallman, 
2011). As a firm globalizes its operations, the exposure to global risks increases and 
increases the likelihood of the firm being subject to disruptions and or product quality 
and safety failures.  Both of these events, of course may have a negative impact on 
the firm’s supply chain performance. A firm’s financial performance is intertwined 
with its supply chain and product performances. A supply chain disruption and or a 
product quality compromise negatively affects a firms financial performance by 
increasing costs, blurring reputation and goodwill, and reducing revenues or firm 
values (e.g. Hendricks and Singhal, 2005; Chen et al., 2009 etc.). It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the empirical results, linking geographic diversification and firm 
performance that have mainly looked at the broader impact of globalization and 
performance linkage and ignored the systematic risks of such a strategy, are not free 
of ambiguity. In fact, these studies have documented many sorts of relationships 
between globalization and overall firm performance, including a negative relationship 
(e.g. Lu and Beamish, 2004), a positive relationship (e.g. Qian et al., 2008), and 
quadratic relationship of both U and inverted-U shapes.  
This dissertation aims to investigate the association between globalization and 
product quality and safety as assessed through product recalls in two essays. 
Specifically, in the first essay, the research will look at a firm’s sourcing practices and 
global market reach and how they relate to a firm’s product quality and safety glitches 
that result in recalls. In this essay, we first look at firm level sourcing behavior( make 
or buy, concentrated or diversified supply base, buy local or buy foreign, and 




relate to product recalls. Referencing agency theory, contract manufacturing either 
inshore or offshore may lead to lower quality performance. Having many suppliers 
and across many countries may make a supply chain very complex. From the 
transactions cost economics, supply chain complexity is considered to have an effect 
on supply chain coordination costs and consequently supply chain performance as 
measured by product conformance.  
In the second essay, the research takes another look at the recall-performance 
relationship. Even though it is of common knowledge that recalls hurt firms, firms 
have not been able to avoid recalls completely. One question remaining to be 
answered therefore is: Does the cost of a recall outweigh the cost of a preventing the 
recall? It is logical to think here that firms may try to balance these two costs in order 
to optimize financial performance. Where the cost of a recall is greater than the 
prevention cost, the firm will try to minimize or avoid recalls. On the other hand, if 
the prevention cost outweighs the recall cost, then the expectation would be that the 
firm may settle for some recalls and prepare to handle the recall. This is possible in 
situations of low cost goods, where demand is highly inelastic to quality compromises 
and in cases where firms have the capacity and capability to handle the recall 
seamlessly or without impact based on a firm’s recall strategy and or the defect type 
that prompts the recall. Other factors that may affect this are the firm’s supply base 
structure and global market and emerging market presence. In this second essay, 
therefore, we first reexamine the recall-profit relationship to determine if a recall 
announcement actually has a debilitating effect on profit. Second, we examine the 




level, the prevention costs outweigh the recall costs such that firms are able to 
improve profits or remain profitable at a positive recall number.  However, at high 
recall levels, the cost of the recalls outweighs the prevention costs, so that profits are 
negative in recalls. As argued in the essay, the cost of a recall may depend on specific 
firm strengths and the structure of the market the firm operates in. A second motive 
therefore, is to examine possible moderators, specifically global reach, supply base 
structure, recall strategy and source of product defects on the recall-profit 
relationship.  
The below diagram, Fig. I, summarizes the entire dissertation.  









1.1. Research Questions 
This dissertation is contributing to this growing body of knowledge by investigating 
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linkages between recalls and firm financial performance. Investigated across two the 
essays, the major research questions are thus:  
1. Are product recalls related to a firm’s sourcing strategy and structure? 
2. Is the product recall-profit relationship moderated by sourcing strategies and 
structure?  
3. Is the product recall-profit relationship moderated by global and emerging 
market penetration?  
4. Is the product recall-profit relationship moderated by the recall strategy and 
the source of the defect, either design or manufacturing?  
 
1.2. Research Contributions 
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it looks at some potential 
antecedents of product recalls within the operations and supply chain management 
context that has been ignored so far. Given that the investigated potential antecedents 
are highly popular firm strategies, their investigation of their impacts on different 
aspects of performance is very important.  Second, this is the first time the impact of 
product quality and safety issues that result in recalls on profit margins with emphasis 
on non-linearities, firms are investigated. Investigating the effect on profit margin is 
quite important as many other performances are driven by the amount of money a 
firm generates from its core operations. Previous research on the effects of product 
recalls has overwhelmingly mainly focused on the effect of wealth of shareholders 
(example Thirumalai and Sinha, 2011; Jarrel and Peltzman, 1985), marketing 




looking at the effects on brand demand (Heerde et al., 2007; Marsh et al. 2004) 
ignoring the opposing cost  effects: one through the cost of the recall (correcting and 
replacing the defective product) and the other through savings that might accrue 
through lower quality and frequency of inspections, and or lower quality and safety 
expenditures. Third, a potential non-linear relationship between recalls and 
performance, which has not been investigated before, that enable firms to recall 
products a certain number of times without concomitant impact on performance is 
investigated. This is a significant contribution because it partially explains the ever 
increasing recall incidents. It also redirects some attention to strategies that dampens 









Essay 1: Global Sourcing and Quality recalls 
1. Introduction 
Product recalls are on the rise (Hora et al., 2011), despite quality improvement effort 
across industries. The Consumer Product Safety Commission’s (CPSC) recall 
announcements, for instance, have doubled over the past ten years, as have the 
number of individual items recalled. According to one Gallup poll, this spate of 
recalls has affected public confidence in product safety and the ability of both 
government and firms to assure safety (Marucheck et al., 2011).  Consequently, 
product recalls have had damaging effects on firm performance. Furthermore, The 
CPSC estimated in 2009 that safety failures that result in deaths, injuries, or property 
damages cost the country more than $800 billion annually. More recently, media 
reports put a price tag of US $2 billion on the 2009 Toyota recalls due to lost output 
and lost sales worldwide (e.g., BBC 2010, Time 2010).  
Product recalls are quality failures of supply chains because the finished 
product quality is the agglomeration of the individual quality control efforts of each 
member in the supply chain. While quality management has garnered substantial 
interest (see for example Sousa and Voss, 2002 for a review), quality failures have 
been understudied from the supply chain perspective. Among the most commonly 
adopted supply chain sourcing strategies are outsourcing and offshoring of 
manufacturing (Hayes, et al. 2005). Almost all industries have seen an increase in 
outsourcing activity, ranging from business processes and information technology 




While outsourcing can be motivated by a variety of reasons, cost savings are most 
often the driving force (e.g., Landis et al., 2005; Insinga and Werle, 2000; Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse 2005; Cecere, 2005). However, outsourcing may have unintended 
consequences, such as increased exposure to quality risks resulting from reduced 
control and visibility in the supply chain (e.g., Doig et al. 2001, Landis et al. 2005, 
Robinson et al., 2008).  A Deloitte study reported that over 60% of its respondents 
returned some outsourced services back in-house and over 40% said they did not 
realize the expected benefits from outsourcing due to increased risks (Landis, et al. 
2005). On the other hand, it has been argued that product recalls have often been a 
result of poor design and other factors unrelated to outsourcing. Mattel, for example, 
has been known for high profile recalls due to lead paint from a supplier of one of 
Mattel’s main contract manufacturers, but a large number of its recalls resulted from 
its own product design flaw that failed to secure small magnet pieces in its products 
(Beamish and Bapuji 2008). In spite of the common belief that connects outsourcing 
with product recalls, no rigorous analysis has been conducted to provide concrete 
evidence of the existence of this link. This leads to the following research question: 
are quality recalls associated with the outsourcing or offshoring in supply chains?  
Even though a large volume of work has been done on the antecedents of 
market versus total integration type of governance (example Williamson, 1979 and 
1991, Barney, 1999) with focus on direct costs and costs of transactions, little 
research has been done examining how different governance forms affect product 
quality in particular. In a broader perspective, Leiblein et al., (2002) suggests an 




including not only profits but risks as well. As put by Marucheck et al., (2011), 
outsourcing and offshoring have made supply chains longer and more complex, with 
increased numbers of hands touching products as they move across the supply chain 
nodes and across international boundaries. It is plausible that the increased 
complexity and the lengthening of supply chains as a consequence of outsourcing and 
offshoring may negatively affect product quality.  
In this paper, we first empirically investigate whether product recalls are 
associated with a firm’s global sourcing decisions. Specifically, we examine the 
relationships between recalls and the extent to which the firm’s supply chain is 
outsourced or offshored. Research has shown that outsourcing may lead to poor 
quality performance (Hsieh et al. 2002) and offshoring production may be linked to 
lower quality ratings (Gray et al. 2011). Other recall related literature focuses on 
conceptual guidance and research directions (example Lyles et al. 2008; Marucheck 
et al. 2011). However, an empirical connection is needed to be established between 
outsourcing and offshoring and quality recalls.  
A strategic decision that is closely tied to outsourcing and offshoring is supply 
base concentration.  The supply base of a firm may be concentrated among few 
suppliers and/or across few countries, which may be related to a firm’s exposure to 
supply chain disruptions; quality and safety compromises; and, consequently, to 
product recalls. We, therefore, examine supply base concentration and its relationship 
with product recalls. As supply chains have become increasingly global and 
specialized, supply bases have also evolved. There are two ways in which supply base 




supply base concentration (i.e., a dispersed supply base) may be directly related to 
product recalls. Supply chain visibility and traceability can be much more difficult 
across many suppliers and across international boundaries as supply chains become 
diverse and global. Consequently, global supply chains may be more exposed to risks 
and vulnerable to disruptions (e.g. Rice and Caniato, 2003; Stauffer 2003; Chopra and 
Sodhi 2004; Tang 2006; Tohmatsu, 2007) increasing the risk of quality and safety 
failures that triggers recalls.  
Second, supply base concentration may moderate the outsourcing/offshoring-
recall relationship. Consolidation and concentration of suppliers could reduce 
searching, monitoring, enforcement, and coordination costs (for example Zhao et al., 
2007 etc.)
1
.  Alternatively, a diverse supply base may lead to more complex supply 
chains (Choi et al., 2001; Craighead et al. 2007; Bozarth et al. 2009), which can 
increase uncertainty in the supply chain. Higher uncertainty may have coordination 
and monitoring implications (Denis et al. 2002; Bodnar et al. 1999).  It is plausible 
that supplier dispersion may enhance the positive relationship between outsourcing 
and offshoring intensity and recalls due to the increasing transactional complexity and 
coordination challenges of dealing with multiple suppliers. Shirking, intentional or 
unintentional, may increase where coordination and monitoring difficulties exist. In 
contrast, a supply chain with a more concentrated supplier base may be able to 
contain its complexity and minimize its risks associated with product recalls. 
Arguably on the other hand, diversifying the supply base may introduce competition 
                                                 
1
 Supply chain concentration has been found to potentially lead to higher financial performance (Lanier 
et al., 2010).  In addition, more concentrated supply bases have been found to operate with reduced 
inventory costs (Trevelen, 1987), leading to cost savings (e.g., Guimaraes et al., 2002) and to benefits 




among competing suppliers which may improve performance. However, given 
difficulties in measuring quality performance, coupled with the fact that there are 
multiple performance metrics in buyer-supplier relationship, supplier attention may 
be directed towards more easily measured performance criteria, such as cost and or 
delivery speed (Holstrom and Milgrom, 1991). This may put quality performance on 
the back seat offsetting any gains from the inter-supplier competition.  
We are looking at three major issues in this paper as it follows from the 
previous paragraphs. First, we empirically investigate the link between outsourcing 
and offshoring (outsourcing conducted with foreign companies) and product quality 
failures as assessed through product recalls. Second, we examine the linkages 
between consolidation of the supply base to a small number of suppliers and countries 
and product recalls. We suggest two different relationships between supply base 
concentration and recalls: a direct effect through reduced exposure to risks and a 
moderating effect through diminished transactional complexity and coordination 
challenges. Our findings indicate that both outsourcing and offshoring have 
significant and positive impact on product recalls. Interestingly, we find that 
outsourcing to a smaller supplier base may actually lead to fewer recalls. Moreover, 
diversifying the supply base across many suppliers or international boundaries 
appears to compound the positive association between outsourcing and offshoring and 
product recalls.  
The rest of this work is organized as follows. A review of literature is 
presented in the next section, followed by hypotheses developed from the literature 




The results are presented and discussed in section 5 with conclusion in the last 
section. 
2. Literature Review 
The central goal of this paper is to explain the linkages between supply chain 
strategies (outsourcing, offshoring, and supply base concentration) and product 
quality failures as assessed through product recalls.  To develop the theoretical 
underpinnings for the research hypotheses, we draw upon literature on strategic 
sourcing and quality management, as well as on theory of transaction cost economics 
and agency theory.  
 
2.1. Quality management and product recalls 
Quality management (QM) research has focused on quality programs within a firm or 
facility and is quite developed (Sousa & Voss, 2002). However, there is a dearth of 
QM literature focusing on quality issues in a supply chain setting. Consequently, 
multiple scholars have suggested that attention be directed to extending the QM 
literature to include a supply chain perspective (for example Robinson & Malhotra, 
2005). Notable exceptions are analytical works that have studied relative 
effectiveness of different forms of managing quality at contract manufacturer or a 
supplier (example Hart et al., 199; Economides, 1999; Hwang et al. 2006) and 
empirically (e.g., Forker 1997, Trent and Monczka 1999; Handley and Gray, 2012). 
However, none of these studies looked at how quality risks of a manufacturer are 
affected by the decision to outsource to several suppliers or a few suppliers. As it 




locations, on average, perform worse in quality (Gray et al., 2011). However, our 
paper looks at offshore outsourcing as opposed to offshore manufacturing by the 
same company which Gray et al. (2011) looked at. We are also investigating the 
effect of manufacturing in a number of countries rather than manufacturing in a single 
country. 
As it relates to product recalls, the popular press has covered well-known 
quality failures that have resulted in product recalls and have often linked these 
recalls to outsourced manufacturing. Recently, there has been an increase in empirical 
research in operations management on product recalls. Marucheck et al. (2011), in an 
editorial note, summarized the issues and outlined research opportunities in product 
safety research. They indicated industries that are prone to recalls and areas that have 
potential for academic research, including supplier relationship management. 
Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) conducted an empirical investigation of the causes of 
recalls in the medical devices industry. They found that research firms are more likely 
to make recalls and that product diversification and past recall experience are 
negatively correlated with future recalls. Earlier studies also found a negative 
relationship between learning experience and recalls. Haunschild and Rhee (2004) 
found that past voluntary recalls had a negative effect on future recalls. Beamish and 
Bapuji (2008) suggested that outsourcing to China has not primarily contributed to 
recalls, but rather most recalls are due to design flaws which were created by issues in 
the home country.  
Most of the research into product recalls has been on the impact of recalls on 




researchers have examined the effects of recalls on demand (Crafton et al., 1981; 
Reilly and Hofer, 1983), on brand equity (Dawar et al., 2000), on marketing 
effectiveness (Herde et al., 2007), and on wealth of sellers (e.g., Jarrell and Peltzman, 
1985; Hoffer et al., 1988; Thirumalai and Sinha, 2011). Despite observed challenges 
with outsourcing, the QM literature has not provided sufficient practical and theory-
based guidance to brand-owning firms that outsource production to secondary or 
offshore manufacturers, nor have product recalls been associated sufficiently with 
outsourcing or supply base consolidation strategies.  
This paper contributes to the literature by linking explicitly the quality 
management literature, the outsourcing/offshoring decision, and product recalls.  
Specifically, this paper investigates the extent to which outsourcing and offshoring, as 
well as the concentration of a firm’s supply base structure, has bearing on product 
quality as indicated by product recalls. Further, this paper investigates the interaction 
between supply base structures and outsourcing on product quality failures, largely 
ignored to date in the literature. This is significant contribution because the decision 
to outsource goes in tandem with the decision on the number of contract 
manufactures or suppliers. 
 
2.2. Outsourcing and Offshoring 
Outsourcing decisions involve the choice between activities firms conduct themselves 
and activities firms buy from other firms (outsource) (Stukey and White, 1993).  
Studies have pointed out that outsourcing creates competitive advantages for firms 
(e.g., Narasimhan and Das, 1999). The growth in popularity of the practice has led 




and Kakabadse, 2003, Holcomb and Hilt, 2007, Kroes and Gosh 2010). There are 
quite a few theories across scholarly fields that describe the role outsourcing plays in 
creating competitive advantage for the outsourcing firm. Kroes and Gosh (2010) note 
that these theories include agency theory, transaction cost economics (TCE) and the 
resource based view.  
Agency theory explains the motivation to outsource as a tactical move to 
delegate responsibility to an outsourcing firm leading to lower costs for the 
outsourcer ( Kroes and Ghosh, 2010).  The seminal work of Williamson (1975 and 
1985) on transaction cost economics suggests that firms will either make or buy 
depending on the cost of doing business in the market. This theory has been widely 
referenced as a theoretical basis for many papers on outsourcing. The TCE 
proposition is that firms will outsource if outsourcing leads to a lower cost of 
transactions (Holcomb and Hilt 2007). This proposition holds true even when 
outsourcing introduces other costs, such as governance costs, as long as it leads to 
overall lower costs (Leiblein, 2003). The seminal work of Barney (1991) suggests 
that unique resources, capabilities and processes can provide a competitive advantage 
for a firm. From the outsourcing perspective, the resource base view states that 
outsourcing involves the decision of whether to use a firm’s internal resources or to 
depend on other firms’ resources to create competitive advantage.  
Offshoring can be broadly defined as the relocation of some of the 
manufacturing or production stages to a foreign country. Although, it can happen 




transactions with firms in a foreign country, for our study offshoring is defined as 
international outsourcing.  
Considerable research has looked at the performance of outsourcing and 
offshoring. In summarizing the literature on IT outsourcing, Lacity et al. (2010) 
reported that the empirical findings are conflicting.  Results from outsourcing and 
offshoring have been found to be negative, positive, or insignificant. Some papers 
have found a negative curvilinear relationship between outsourcing and firm 
performance, using measures such as market share (Katobe et al., (2012) and 
financial performance (e.g., Grimpe and Kaiser 2010, Kotabe and Mole 2004, Kotabe 
et al,. 2008, Rothermel et al., 2006). While some empirical studies have found that 
outsourcing leads to lower operational costs (e.g., Jiang et al. 2006) or higher firm 
value (Hays et al, 2000), others have found no relation to profitability (Jiang et al. 
2006, Kimura 2002). In addition, opportunistic provider behavior has been noted in 
the literature as a concern with outsourcing (e.g., Halcomb and Hitt, 2007, Mclvor, 
2009). 
While these theories and the empirical literature testing the efficacies of 
outsourcing as a strategy are well espoused, albeit with mixed findings, the literature 
so far has not looked deeply into the quality implications involved in lengthening and 
complicating the supply chain through outsourcing and offshoring.  Our paper is well 
positioned to fill this void by linking outsourcing and offshoring to product recalls 
that emanate from quality failures. Further, as indicated earlier, we are linking the 





2.3. Supply Base concentration 
Quite a few papers have been written on the concentration-performance relationship. 
It has been argued that concentrated supply bases have superior financial performance 
than more disperse supplier bases (Lanier et al., 2010).  In addition, concentrated 
supply bases have been found to operate with reduce inventory costs (Trevelen, 
1987), leading to cost savings (e.g., Guimaraes et al., 2002) and to benefits from scale 
economies through volume orders (Hahn et al., 1986).  
 However, not much has been done in linking supply base concentration with 
quality performance or quality failures that result in recalls. Notwithstanding this 
dearth of work, the broader literature on the relationship between supply chain 
complexity and performance can be used to motivate a linkage between supply base 
concentration and quality management. Complexity constructs defined by many 
academics have included measures of both supply base concentration and geographic 
diversification of suppliers. The number of suppliers has been identified as a 
complexity driver (Choi et al., 2001; Wu and Choi, 2005; Goffin et al., 2006; Bozarth 
et al., 2009) as well as the extent of globalization of the supply base (Cho and Kang, 
2001; Nellore et al., 2001; Bozarth et al., 2009). Supply chain complexity has been 
shown to have a negative impact on service quality (Milgate, 2001; Vachon and 
Klassen, 2002) and manufacturing performance (example Bozarth et al., 2009).  
Even though these studies have linked complexity to performance, linkages 
between supply base complexity and quality performance has not been established 






3. Hypotheses development 
We draw upon agency theory to develop our hypotheses in this research. Even 
though the primary theoretical background is provided by agency theory which is 
used in developing the first two hypotheses, transactions cost economics (TCE) 
theory is used in developing the second set hypotheses and the intersection between 
agency theory and TCE is used for the last set of hypotheses. 
Agency theory suggests that a combination of information acquisition, interest 
misalignment, moral hazard, and adverse selection (Fleisher, 1991) drives agency 
costs such as specifying, rewarding, monitoring, and policing the agent’s behavior. 
Agency theory considers situations where information asymmetry and interest 
misalignment exists between a principal and an agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Under this 
situations, the theory suggests that the agent would try to optimize its own interests at 
the expense of the principal which often may be suboptimal for the principal (Laffont 
and Martimort, 2002). In this study, the manufacturer or brand owning firm is 
considered the principal and the suppliers are considered as the agents. The rationale 
is that the brand owning firms own the activities that are delegated to the contract 
manufacturers or suppliers as in our case, and the brand owning firms’ management 
interests are aligned with that of the firm. 
This context has been used modestly across disciplinary boundaries in 
studying inter-firm boundaries and quality conformance. First, several analytic 
modeling papers have looked at vertical integration in a dyadic relationship and 
quality performance (example Economides, 1999; Kaya and Ozer, 2009; Lu et al., 




misalignment leading to the suggestions that quality is lower in a decentralized 
system. Other similar papers focused on moral hazard problem in a dyadic 
relationship when information asymmetry is present (example Baiman et al., 2000; 
Balachandran and Radhakrishnan, 2005; Hwang et al., 2006; Chao et al., 2009). 
Empirically, there is a dart of work on quality performance in inter-
organizational relationships. Notable exceptions are few works in the service 
industry. Findings similar to the analytical modeling papers referenced above are 
noted. The general consensus is that vertically integrated operations provide higher 
service quality. In the hotel industry for instance, hotel chains operating with more 
franchises were found to have lower service quality (Michael, 2000). More recently, 
Hsieh et al. (2010) found that disintegrated courier service providers have more 
delivery time variability than integrated ones. These papers show that in an 
outsourcing environment even in the service industry, quality may be lower than in a 
fully vertically integrated system.  
TCE is used as a secondary theoretical background in this study. TCE 
(Williamson 1979 and 1985) suggests that uncertainty, bounded rationality, and 
opportunistic behavior create transaction costs and that the primary objective in 
organizing trade is to minimize such costs within and between firms (Ketchen and 
Hult, 2007). Market mechanisms perform better with low transactions costs.  High 
transactions costs favor internalization as a governance mechanism (Williamson 
1979).  Williamson (1985) suggested four forms of transactions costs, including 
searching, contracting, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Additional transaction 




defined as the cost of information sharing and transaction risk (Clemons et al., 1993), 
defined as the risk of shirking responsibilities.  
Traditionally, in its primary form, the theory suggests instances in which one 
of the two extreme governance forms, make or buy, is optimal. The theory has also 
been used in explaining intermediate governance structures, such as contractual 
relationships (e.g., Rabinovich et al., 2007). Recently however, application of the 
normative nature of TCE which suggests that high transactions costs would be 
associated with low performance levels has been used in studying the relationship 
between supply chain structures and performance (example Lanier et al., 2010). 
Specifically as it applies to our study, concentrating a supply base which may reduce 
supply base complexity, could reduce upstream search, contracting, monitoring and 
enforcement costs (Zhao et al., 2007; Das et al., 2006; Choi and Krause, 2006; 
Corsten and Kumar, 2005) as well as coordination costs and transactions risks (Lanier 
et al., 2010). Choi and Krause (2006) suggests that the number of suppliers and 
consequently supply base complexity increases the total transactions costs of the focal 
manufacturing firm and that reducing the number of suppliers for instance, would 
reduce supply base transactions costs. Using this reasoning, Lanier et al., (2010) for 
instance find that concentrated supply chains are associated with higher performance 
defined financially.  
These two theories are used to motivate the research hypotheses in this paper. 
Our contributions to these theoretical literatures come in four forms: 





b. providing empirical evidence of the agency theory in the quality domain in 
the product industry  
c. showing that location of the agents (offshore) exacerbate the agency 
problem 
d. developing managerial contingencies in an outsourcing environment by 
intersecting TCE and agency theory in including two key supply base 
structure moderators 
      
3.1. Outsourcing and Offshoring relationship with product recalls 
While quality improvement efforts are critical for best quality performance, there are 
many factors that work in conjunction to achieve quality excellence (Soussa and 
Voss, 2002; Nair, 2006).  Toyota has historically been considered a quality 
management leader, for instance, consistently ranked number 1 by customers, both 
prior to and after the massive recalls in 2009 (http://www.consumerreports.org). 
Toyota is also ranked consistently as an industry leader in quality by professionals 
(e.g., JD Power and Associates; Kelly Blue Book). However, Toyota’s quality 
management prowess could not prevent the 2009 recalls, and since that time, Toyota 
has made more than 22 recalls on 2010 and later car models.  Despite Toyota’s 
sustained effort to maintain best quality, these recalls suggest that its goals of quality 
excellence are difficult to attain in an outsourcing environment.  
A key argument involves the impossibility of total awareness of quality efforts 
and actions of its suppliers and the subsequent incentive misalignment that may 




critical to quality performance can be difficult to observe by the buyer or 
manufacturer (as principal). Even though the buyer can monitor a supplier in a 
number of ways, total control over the supplier’s production and procurement 
processes under outsourcing is almost impossible. In fact, loss of control is inevitable 
when a firm delegates authority to another organization (Laffont and Martimort, 
2002), which encourages supplier moral hazard when the opportunistic supplier 
shirks its responsibilities. Second, the buyer’s quality objectives may not be aligned 
with those of the supplier’s.  As demonstrated in the Mattel toy recall in 2007, a 
supplier, knowing that compromising quality costs the supplier little in terms of 
reputation while allowing for immediate gains, could have an incentive to deviate 
from its quality standards, leading to inefficiency associated with moral hazard. 
Compounding this situation is the difficulty in measuring quality performance as it 
may often be a composite of multiple individual performance measures. . Where there 
are many outcomes, effort can be funneled to the outcomes that are easily 
measurable, such as (Holstrom and Milgrom, 1991) cost or on-time delivery. These 
arguments from the agency theory suggest that quality may be lower with outsourced 
production as compared to in-house manufacturing.  
 
Hypothesis 1a. Product recalls are positively associated with a firms’ 
outsourcing intensity.  
When outsourcing moves manufacturing offshore to other countries, as firms 
have increasingly done to take advantage of low costs in labor and other resources, 




under outsourcing as we have suggested. Cultural issues, such as different perceptions 
on governance and legal infrastructural weaknesses in the enforcement of contractual 
terms, endemic in developing countries that are beneficiaries of most of the foreign 
outsourcing, are enabling environments for opportunistic behaviors of suppliers 
(Lyles et al., 2008; Lou 2008). Being far from the market may also help the suppliers 
to divert blame when there is a quality failure. Therefore, moral hazard may lead to 
more quality concerns when the supplier is located in a foreign country. Further, 
effective communication is hindered between the manufacturer (principal) and the 
suppliers (agents) in an offshore outsourcing situation. Geographic distance, travel 
distance, language distance and cultural distance each or together may inhibit 
information flow between the manufacturer and the suppliers increasing information 
asymmetry (Stringfellow et al., 2007). This increases risks associated with moral 
hazards. Moreover, in investigating the US pharmaceutical industry, Gray et al., 
(2011) found that quality risk varies by the location of the manufacturing facility. 
They found that products manufactured in offshore locations pose higher quality risks 
than their counterparts produced within the United States, even after controlling for 
distance and learning effects.  
 
Hypothesis 1b. The positive relationship between outsourcing and product 





3.2. Supply base concentration and product recalls 
The complex and globalized supply chains, resulting from outsourcing and 
offshoring, often involve a large number of suppliers. Mattel had 37 certified 
suppliers and hundreds of others in China alone in 2007 (Bapuji and Beamish 2008).   
Diversifying the supply base could lead to supply chains with “upstream 
complexity” (Choi et al., 2001; Wu and Choi 2005; Choi and Krause, 2006; Bozarth 
et al. 2009). Supply chain complexity can lead to high costs of coordination (Denis et 
al., 2002), make monitoring much more difficult and costly (Bodnar et al., 1999) and 
increase information asymmetry (Harris et al., 1982; Myerson 1982). Supply base 
complexity also may increase supplier risks and reduce supplier responsiveness (Choi 
and Krause, 2006).  From the perspective of TCE on quality, more specifically, 
supply base complexity may implicitly increase the costs of identifying quality 
problems, contracting for quality performance, monitoring quality standards, and 
enforcing quality control programs. When sourcing is widely distributed across a 
large number of suppliers, individual suppliers may expect higher uncertainties in 
their supply relationships with the buyer and more likely develop opportunistic 
behavior in quality improvement effort.   In addition, a concentrated supply chain 
should enable visibility and traceability, leading to early detection of production and 
supply chain issues.  
Another potential driver of product recalls is supplier diversification across 
geographic regions. Even though there is little literature on the effects of global 
sourcing on product quality, the broader context of TCE can offer some insights. 




chain complexity (Bozarth et al., 2009) leading to higher transactions costs. Further, 
nationally diversifying the supply base, in effect, would inhibit inventory visibility 
and traceability and consequently supply chains would be more exposed to 
disruptions (e.g. Rice and Caniato, 2003; Stauffer 2003; Chopra and Sodhi 2004; 
Tang 2006; Deloitte Consulting, 2007). I addition, the effects of such complexity can 
be compounded through geographic and cultural distances among the member 
countries. Knowledge transfer needed to attain quality levels across the supply chain; 
for example, from a parent company to suppliers or subsidiaries, can be hindered by 
both physical and cultural distances (Gray et al., 2011).     
Hypothesis 2a. Product recalls are negatively associated with the degree of 
concentration among a firm’s suppliers. 
Hypothesis 2b. Product recalls are negatively associated with the degree of 
geographical/national concentration of a firm’s suppliers. 
 
As this relationship between supplier concentration and recall is developed 
from uncertainties and moral hazard issues, it overlaps with the relationship between 
outsourcing (and offshoring) and product recalls. Both relationships have transaction 
cost implications on product design, production, and quality management.   
Specifically, a more concentrated supplier base under outsourcing may ease a firm’s 
effort in coordination, monitoring and enforcement of the quality activities conducted 
by the suppliers, leading to lower transaction costs involved in such effort.  
Consequently, supplier concentration may mitigate the negative relationship between 




number of suppliers is associated with increased information and physical flows and 
greater numbers of relationships to be managed. These high information and physical 
flows needed in a diverse supply base increases the risk misinformation(information 
asymmetry) as well as exposure of the product to supply chain disturbances that may 
compromise quality and safety. Furthermore, the distribution of the suppliers directly 
affects the visibility of the supply chains, as a large number of small suppliers may 
make communication and information sharing in the supply chains more difficult, 
further aggravating the moral hazard problem.  
Geographic concentration of suppliers may also moderate how offshoring is 
associated with product recalls. A supply chain that spans several international 
boundaries can be more complex than a chain concentrated in one country, for a 
given number of suppliers (Bozarth et al. 2009; Craighead et al., 2007). Supply base 
complexity can also lead to high costs of coordination (Denis et al., 2002), making 
monitoring much more difficult and costly (Bodnar et al., 1999) with higher 
information asymmetry (Harris et al., 1982; Myerson 1982). Consequently, 
geographic diversification (concentration) may strengthen (weaken) the negative 
relationship between offshoring and quality due to higher degree of complexity in 
business transactions and coordination among suppliers across geographic 
boundaries. 
Hypothesis 3a. The positive relationship between outsourcing and product 




Hypothesis 3b. The positive relationship between offshoring and product 
recall announcements is weaker when the supply base is more concentrated 
nationally. 
4. Model Development and Data 
In this section, we develop econometric models to test the above hypotheses. The 
modeling framework is based on the relationships between product recalls and 
outsourcing intensity, offshoring intensity, sourcing concentration by suppliers and by 
geographic locations. Furthermore, additional moderating effects are also examined 
between supplier concentration, outsourcing, and offshoring. Outsourcing and 
offshoring intensity are expected to be positively related to the number of recalls 
(H1b and H1b) and concentration in both suppliers and geographic locations are 
expected to be negatively related to recalls (H2a and H2b). Also, supply base 
concentration and national concentration are expected to water down the positive 
relationship between outsourcing/offshoring and product recalls (H3a and H3b). 

























4.1. The Empirical Model 
The dependent variable is the number of recalls, and the explanatory variables are 
outsourcing and offshoring intensity and supplier and national concentration levels. 
An econometric model is proposed that captures these effects. Given that recalls are 
infrequent for firms and the number of recalls is a count data, it is best to characterize 
our dependent variable by a Poisson or Negative Binomial distribution.  
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 Recall is the dependent variable measured by the number of recall 
announcements per firm per year.  
 Outsourcing is one of the key independent variables. It measures the extent to 
which firms source from outside their firms as oppose to making products in-
house.  
 Offshore is the second explanatory variable of interest. It measures the extent 
to which a firm sources internationally; i.e., offshores. 
 Supplier concentration is supplier concentration which measures the extent to 
which a firm’s suppliers are concentrated (or diversified). 
 National concentration is concentration of the suppliers of a firm within 
national boundaries. It captures both the number of suppliers residing in a 
country as well as the share of costs expended on them by the manufacturing 
company. 
 R&D intensity is a measure of R&D intensity and is a control variable in the 
model which reflects a firm’s innovative capability and may be associated 
with a firm’s quality performance. R&D efforts of a firm may reduce the 
chances of a quality failure, and, hence, lead to lower recalls. On the other 
hand, higher R&D intensity may also indicate the firm’s focus on innovation 
and new product development, which may increase the likelihood of errors 
and thus positively affects recalls. 
 Prior recall is a control variable aimed at capturing the effect of learning from 
quality and safety failures. Recall events may “trigger renewed attention to the 




operations by bringing new information and resources” (Thirumalai and 
Sinha, 2011, p. 381). As such, prior recalls made by firms may lead to efforts 
that mitigate future recalls. On the other hand, prior recalls may just represent 
poor supply chain management, in which case, one would expect them to be 
positively related to future recalls. 
 Firm size is used as a control variable. Firm size may be positively associated 
with recalls as larger firms usually have a more diversified product base and 
are therefore more complex. 
 Capital intensity is a control variable that may be associated with firm quality 
performance. Capital investments includes investments in information 
technology which may improve visibility of inventory and thus increase the 
chances of detecting and correcting defects before products reach the market. 
Capital intensity is therefore expected to be negatively related to product 
recalls. 
 Industry effects are included as control variables in the model. Three-digit 
North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes are used to 
classify industry sectors. In North America, industry sectors are classified 
primarily based on production processes and technologies, both of which may 
affect product quality and recalls. It is very possible that the nature of 
activities of an industry will be associated with supply chain disruptions.  We 
include these industry-specific dummy variables to control for otherwise 





4.2. Data and Data sources 
To test the hypotheses, we make use of a cross sectional database on publicly traded 
manufacturing firms, including information on their relationships with suppliers and 
buyers, the strength of these relationships, and the recalls made by each firm. By 
using archival data in this analysis, the information gathered is not dependent on 
survey respondents’ perceptions and or attitudes (Goffin et al. 2006).  
This investigation is limited to public firms within the US manufacturing 
sector. The sample uses these firms for a number of reasons. First, the research is 
about “make or buy” decisions and the sector that faces that decision most often is the 
manufacturing sector. Other sectors, such as retail, almost always depend on 
secondary firms for their production needs. No doubt, large retailers, such as 
Walmart, Target and Babies R Us, play a critical role in the US economy and possess 
and exercise significant power over supply chain members. However, they are not 
faced with decisions to make or to buy and, therefore, are not appropriate for this 
analysis.  A second reason is the availability of data on public firms. Since public 
firms are required to make many disclosures, data are only available for these firms.  
Data for this analysis are gathered from three different sources. The main 
hypotheses revolve around outsourcing and offshoring and their impacts on firm 
performance as measured by the number of recalls. The performance data comes from 
two sources. First, the recall data are collected from the US Consumer Product Safety 
Commission’s (CPSC) and US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) recall 
announcements.  Both the CPSC and the FDA record all recall announcements, 




respectively. This information includes the quantity recalled, the average price for the 
recalled products, the type of recall (voluntary or mandatory), and information on 
whether the faulty product has resulted in any incidences. These data are utilized to 
obtain the number of recalls each firm makes within our period of observation.  
To account for firms with zero recalls, we started by collecting information on 
all firms in the manufacturing industry using the 6 digit NAICS code from the 
Compustat data base. Since our explanatory variables are collected from the 
Bloomberg database (explained further below), the analysis is limited and applicable 
to only 2010 and 2011, a two year period for which we collected information on firms 
from the Compustat database. Data is collected on all 6-digit NAICS codes ranging 
from 3111112 to 339999, except for 336111, automobile manufacturing, whose 
jurisdiction on quality and recalls lies outside both CPSC and FDA authorities. This 
data are then matched with the Bloomberg data by company name to get a unique 
dataset of 328 firm observations. Recall announcements are then gathered for these 
328 firms from both the CPSC and FDA databases. We are therefore able to have 
firms that made zero recalls within our study period, as well as firms with as many as 
4 independent recalls. Descriptive data analysis is given in the next section.   
The data for the four explanatory variables capturing outsourcing intensity, 
offshoring intensity and supplier and national concentration, are compiled from the 
Bloomberg database. Bloomberg offers data on about 35,000 firms’ supply chain 
relationships. The data map a company to its suppliers, customers, and competitors, 
and gives an indication of the strength of the relation between any two firms in a 




flows between companies on both a customer (revenue) and supplier (cost) basis. 
Estimates are provided of the percentage of a supplier’s revenue that comes from a 
given buyer, and the percentage of a buyer’s cost of goods sold that is spent on a 
given supplier.  
Bloomberg uses three different methods to compile this dataset. The first, 
termed as the “mathematical method”, derives the supply chain relationship from 
public data as well as from information collected from the companies directly. In the 
second method, Bloomberg has its own algorithm that is used to quantify 
relationships based on content analysis such as announcements from manufacturers or 
their suppliers. Third, Bloomberg also purchases propriety data from other sources. 
Excerpts of the data description by Bloomberg, as well as a screen shot of the supply 
chain data, is given in the appendix. Finally, data on the control variables are 
collected from the Compustat database. 
 
4.3. Measures of Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Recall, the dependent variable is a count variable. The number of independent recalls 
will be used as the dependent variable to test the hypothesized relationship between 
sourcing strategy and performance. A total of four core independent variables are of 
interest in the study. They include outsourcing intensity, offshoring intensity, supplier 
concentration, and national concentration. 
Outsourcing intensity is measured as the percentage of a firm’s cost of goods 
sold (COGS) that are expended on its suppliers as provided in the Bloomberg 










Offshoring intensity is measured as the percentage of a firm’s COGS that is 
expended on foreign firms. Foreign firms mean firms that are registered or 







Both variables measure the extent of relationships with other firms relative to cost of 
goods sold.  
Supplier concentration is measured as the sum of the squares of shares of cost 
of goods sold expended on each supplier following the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 








iS nsupplierco  
where Si is the share of COGS expended on firm i and N is the total number of 
suppliers. A value of 1 indicates that a firm has only one supplier and the value of the 
variable approaches zero as the number of suppliers approach infinity.  
National concentration is calculated as the sum of the squares of shares of cost 








jX Nationcon  
where Xj is the total share of COGS expended on suppliers in country j and M is the 
total number of countries in which the firm has suppliers. Similarly, a value of 1 




R & D is measured by a firm’s research and development expenditure normalized by 
sales, while prior recalls is a cumulative measure of recalls prior to the study year.  
4.3.1. Descriptive statistics  
Firm sourcing characteristics and the distribution of firms by industry are given in 
Table 1 and overall descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2. 
Table 1 Distribution of firms by industry 













311 24 0.272 0.342 0.004 0.292 1.160 
322 12 0.2000 0.331 0.006 0.083 0.167 
325 74 0.235 0.332 0.038 0.324 0.905 
332 12 0.230 0.393 0.017 0.250 1.917 
333 36 0.406 0.304 0.013 0.306 1.028 
334 97 0.630 0.349 0.076 0.092 0.392 
335 8 0.108 0.271 0.001 0.250 0.625 
336 45 0.550 0.356 0.031 0.133 0.533 
337 2 0.009 0.259 0.000 0.500 1.000 
339 18 0.285 0.325 0.010 0.278 2.389 
 
 
From Table 1, it can be seen that firms from the computer and electronics 
manufacturing sector account for about 25% of the firm-years of observations, while 
firms from the leather and nonmetallic manufacturing industries are least represented 
with less than 1% of the observations each. In terms of outsourcing, firms with 
operations in computer and electronics manufacturing outsource the most (63% of 
COGS), followed by transportation equipment (55%). On the other hand, firms in the 
leather industry (<1%), followed by nonmetallic industry firms (1%) have the least 
outsourcing intensity. With respect to geographic locations (national), most industries 
are fairly concentrated in terms of their sourcing behavior. The most concentrated are 
firms in the petroleum industry, sourcing from an equivalent of 3 countries with equal 
shares, and the least concentrated is the plastics and rubber sector with an equivalent 




industries are quite spread out in terms of suppliers. The most concentration of 
suppliers however, is the computer and electronics industry. The highest recalls are in 
the furniture industry with an average of 0.5 recalls per firm over the two year period, 
followed by the chemical industry. In terms of prior recalls, firms classified as “other 
durables” (which includes toy manufacturing) have the most recalls prior to our 
observation years.  
The mean outsourcing intensity for all firms is 17% of cost of goods sold 
(Table 2) with a mean of 0.188 recalls per firm year and a maximum recalls per firm 
year of 4.  
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outsource 328 0.179 0.232 0.000 0.855 
Offshore 328 0.087 0.156 0.000 0.553 
National 
concentration 
328 0.339 0.139 0.117 0.722 
Supplier 
concentration 
328 0.038 0.081 0.000 0.423 
Recall 328 0.188 0.535 0.000 4.000 
Prior recall 328 0.817 1.741 0.000 12.000 





















Table 3 provides the correlations between the variable pairs.  As expected, there is a 
positive correlation between both outsourcing intensity and offshoring intensity and 
recalls.  Both country and supplier concentrations have negative correlations with 
recalls. Interesting, both supply base concentration and national concentration are 
negatively correlated with outsourcing and offshoring respectively. R & D appears to 






Table 3. Correlation between variables 











Recalls 1        
Outsourcing 0.0118 1       












0.0428 0.0233 -0.0072 -0.0732 -0.0258 1   
R&D intensity 0.0989 0.4706 0.0362 0.1089 0.4497 0.0739 1  
Size(sales) 0.3068 0.4291 0.015 -0.2109 0.0898 -0.0266 -0.0425 1 
 
To reduce heteroscedasticity, all variables, except the dependent variable, are 
standardized. To control for industry effects, the models are run using both fixed and 
random industry effects. The estimations using fixed and random effects provide very 
similar results, so only the random effects model results are presented here. As 
suggested earlier, because of the discrete nature of the dependent variable, the 
estimation is best characterized by either a Poisson or a negative binomial 
distribution. This supposition is supported by the graphical/visual presentation of the 
dependent variable observations as shown in Figure 2. Figure 2 supports a Poisson 
distribution. However, the limitations of the Poisson, characterized by only the mean 
(assumption that the mean and variance are equal), makes the negative binomial a 
better distribution for this analysis. In fact, the variance of recalls far exceeds the 
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The regression results are presented in Table 4. There are a total of 5 different 
models. In Model 1, coefficients of the control variables alone are estimated, then 
outsourcing alone plus the other hypothesized variables are added in Model 2. In 
Model 3, the outsourcing variable is split into domestic and offshoring to account for 
the effect of offshoring. The interaction of outsourcing and supply base concentration 
and offshoring and national concentration are respectively estimated in Models 4 and 
5 to limit the effects of multi-collinearity. Overall, all the models have significant 
Wald Chi-squared statistic. For the model, including the hypothesized relationships 
but excluding the interaction terms, the Chi-Squared statistic is 92.04 and highly 
significant at p<0.001. However, all analyses are based on Model 3 for Hypotheses 1a 
through 2b and Models 4 for the outsourcing-concentration interaction effect and 5 
for the offshoring-national concentration effect.  
The coefficient for outsourcing is positive and significant in all of the models 




outsourcing and recalls is positive. This result supports the first hypothesis that recalls 
are positively associated with outsourcing intensive firms. When the outsourcing 
variable is split to account for offshoring (in Model 3), the outsourcing coefficient 
however becomes smaller in magnitude and weakly significant. The offshoring 
variable has a positive coefficient and is significant supporting the second hypothesis. 
The supplier concentration coefficient is negative and significant. As expected, this 
indicates that concentrating the supply base is associated with lower recalls. 
Hypothesis 2a is therefore supported. However, the national concentration coefficient, 
though the expected sign, is insignificant in all 3 models. There is not enough 
evidence, therefore, to support Hypothesis 2b. Because of the high correlation 
between supplier concentration and national concentration, their interaction variables 
are separately investigated in models 4 and 5. The supplier concentration-outsourcing 
interaction is significant and negative supporting Hypothesis 3a. This indicates that 
supply base concentration waters down the negative quality effects of outsourcing. 
The offshoring-national concentration interaction variable also has a significant and 
negative coefficient. Hypothesis 3b is therefore supported.  
 
There are some interesting results from the control variables as well. R&D 
intensity is positively associated with recalls, as indicated by the significant positive 
coefficient. The results support the notion that higher R&D intensity is an indication 
of a firm’s focus on innovation and new product development. This may increase the 
likelihood of errors and thus positively affects recalls. There is a possible second 




likely to monitor and discover product defects that dictate a recall.  Since our 
database does not differentiate between voluntary and mandatory recalls, firms with 
high R&D may have greater frequency of voluntary recalls as a consequence of their 
R&D. The coefficient for Capex (capital intensity) is not significant at any reasonable 
level and therefore, is found not to have a relationship with product recalls. Larger 
firms are associated with more recalls as given by the positive and significant 
coefficient on the size variable. Contrary to expectation, the prior recall coefficient is 
positive and significant. This contradicts prior findings that previous recalls are 



















Model 3      
(Standard error) 




R&D intensity 0.397**(0.136) 0.440***(0.136) 0.434***(0.134) 0.534***(0.157) 0.499***(0.147) 
Capital intensity  -0.007(0.181)  -0.056(0.183)  -0.061(0.182)  -0.040185(0.204)  -0.116(0.210) 
Firm size (sales) 0.384***(0.100) 0.420***(0.128) 0.440***(0.119) 0.550***(0.142) 0.481***(0.123) 
prior recall 0.471***(0.076) 0.479***(0.076) 0.482***(0.076) 0.402***(0.074) 0.408***(0.074) 
outsourcing (aggregate) - 0.601**(0.275)  -  0.629**(0.787) - 
Outsourcing (domestic) - - 0.057*(0.034) - . - 
offshore (offshore outsourcing) - - 0.549**(0.251)  -  0.568*(0.291) 
Supplier concentration -  -0.674*(0.353)  -0.603**(0.226)  -0.969*(0.537) - 




 -  -0.573**(0.276) - 




Number of observations 328 328 328 328 328 
Number of industries 10 10 10 10 10 
Mean observations per industry 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6 31.6 
Model Wald Chi-Squared 61.19 91.35 92.04 91.93 90.92 
Model Probability (>chi-squared) 0 0 0 0 0 





6. Discussions, research implications and limitations 
6.1. Conclusions and limitations 
6.1.1. Direct relationships 
 
Product recalls are on the rise. Toyota for instance, recently made the largest 
automotive recall in history on the 10
th
 of October 2012 and this followed the recall 
associated with pedals and floor mats in 2009. It cannot be overemphasized that the 
most globalized industries, both in terms of sourcing and market reach, are most 
associated with recalls. The combination of product recalls and increased 
globalization has resulted in the juxtaposition of these two trends. There is however, 
no established theoretical relationship between outsourcing and product recalls and 
there is even some empirical evidence that there is no relationship. The main 
contribution of this paper therefore, is to investigate the relationship between the 
extent of outsourcing/ the extent of offshoring and product quality/ safety 
performance, as assessed through recalls.  In addition, we examine the moderating 
effect of supply base and national concentration on the outsourcing-recall 
relationship. 
A major contribution of this paper is the focus on both outsourcing and 
offshoring, distinguishing between them and hypothesizing their effects separately. 
The separation of outsourcing from offshoring helps in identifying the sources of 
quality issues in an outsourcing environment. This distinction separates this study 
from a number of other studies on vertical integration and manufacturing outsourcing. 
This is a theoretical contribution as it implicitly suggests that the moral hazard 




most of the quality issues emanating from outsourcing are driven by offshore-
outsourcing (offshoring) provides an interesting insight and a major contribution to 
the research stream.  
Second, our empirical results show that outsourcing is associated with lower 
quality and safety performance. This finding is in line with well-known operations 
management theories, such as, knowledge transfer, transactions cost economics, and 
agency theory. Knowledge transfer indicates difficulties in transferring knowledge 
across firm boundaries. There may be difficulties in alignment among firms in the 
supply chain resulting in quality and safety failures. Transactions cost economics 
indicates supply chain complexity will increase with extensive globalization. This 
will result in difficulties in managing over the entire supply chain and lead to quality 
failures. Agency theory links opportunistic behavior with the delegation of authority 
(example outsourcing) leading to quality and safety failures that result in recalls. 
Offshoring, as expected, is positively associated with product recalls; that is, 
offshoring intensity is associated with more recalls. As argued in the hypotheses 
development, outsourcing to offshore suppliers engenders the moral hazard problem 
that may follow outsourcing. In fact, when the variable is split to account for 
offshoring, it appears that most of the negative quality performance is generated by 
outsourcing to offshore suppliers. The quality problems in outsourcing, are, therefore, 
more driven by outsourcing to offshore locations than just outsourcing. This finding 
is demonstrated in Fig. 3 estimated from the results in Model 3.  It can be seen from 




small relationship to recalls. On the other hand, Offshoring almost equals the total 
outsourcing slope.  
 




A second motivation of the research was to investigate the association 
between supply base concentration and recalls. Referencing transactions cost 
economics theory and literature on supply chain complexity, we hypothesized that 
diversifying a firm’s supply base may be associated with greater numbers of product 
recalls. This finding reinforces prior research showing that concentration within a 
supply chain may be associated with superior firm performance as measured by other 
metrics as cost, profits, and inventory (example Lanier et al., 2010; Trevelen, 1987; 




quality performance. A direct relationship between national concentration and quality 
was however was not found.   
 
 
6.1.2. Moderating effect of supply base and national concentration 
 
The most important of our contributions to the literature is the finding that 
diversification of both supply base and national location enhances the relationships 
between outsourcing and quality and offshoring and quality, respectively. To clearly 
illustrate this, we look at the marginal impact of changes in offshoring and 
outsourcing environment on the number of recalls. From the Model 4 results, the 
equations below can be used to obtain the effect of outsourcing on recalls at the mean 




At the mean levels of supplier concentration for instance (that is suppliercon = 0), the 
marginal effect of outsourcing intensity on recalls is 0.629. This means that a 
standard deviation change in outsourcing intensity is positively associated with 0.629 
recalls.  



















These results imply that for firms with a supply base with a concentration level that is 
one standard deviation above the mean value, a standard deviation change in 
outsourcing is only positively associated with 0.056 recalls. However, for a firm that 
operates in a diversified supply base of one standard deviation below the mean 
concentration level, a standard deviation change in outsourcing is positively 
associated with 1.2 recalls. This moderating effect of supply base concentration is 
illustrated in Fig.4. 







Clearly, from Fig. 4, there is a stronger relationship between outsourcing and recalls 
for less supply base concentrated firms (firms with one standard deviation below the 
mean concentration) as illustrated by the higher slope (dotted line).   
The moderating effect of national concentration on offshoring can be similarly 
estimated and is demonstrated in Fig.5 below from the Model 5 results. It is important 
to note here that national concentration does not appear to have any direct 
relationship with recalls. However, when interacted with offshoring, the result is 
significant and positive as expected. 
 
Fig. 5. Product Recall and Offshoring: The Moderating Role of national concentration 
 
 
6.2. Managerial implications 
One important managerial implication of our study is that both outsourcing and 
offshoring may be associated with unintended consequences, such as product non-




therefore be taken into account with any cost saving decisions that result from 
outsourcing. 
A second finding in this paper is the relationship between supply base 
concentration and product recalls. This finding also has an important managerial 
implication.  Recently, large firms have been diversifying their supply bases as a risk 
mitigation strategy. For example, Flextronics was the sole EMS supplier for the 
Xbox. However, Microsoft added Wistron and Celestica as suppliers in 2004 (Hoyt 
and Lee, 2006) in order to diversify supply risk. While doing so, Microsoft may be 
adding to potential quality issues. While national diversification of the supply base 
does not appear to have any relationship with quality failures that result in recalls, it 
exacerbates the quality issues associated with offshoring. Managers should therefore 
pay attention to the number of countries they are sourcing from as sourcing decisions 
are taken.  
Moreover, attention should be drawn to the finding that having fewer 
suppliers may reduce the negative quality effects as firms outsource. This is important 
because not only does concentration of the supply base reduces the exposure of the 
supply chain to disturbances but also limits difficulties associated with transactions 
and coordination needed for effective relationship management in an outsourcing 
environment. Firms may be able to reap the cost benefits associated with outsourcing 
and be able to limit the quality effects by concentrating their outsourcing behavior 





6.3. Research Implications 
There are a number of important research and managerial implications of our 
findings. An important research implication is that outsourcing may have both direct 
and indirect effects on firm performance. The direct effect is through cost savings. 
Indirectly however, outsourcing may be associated with product recalls counteracting 
the direct cost savings. Perhaps, this is one explanation as to why research on 
outsourcing-performance relationships has inconsistent findings. There is potential 
for future research in this direction. The literature has pointed out cost savings as the 
main driver of outsourcing. It may be possible to attain the cost savings resulting 
from outsourcing whilst maintaining good quality if certain conditions are present; 
that is, firms may take actions that keep recalls at a minimum but still rely on 
secondary firms for their manufacturing. The investigation of such moderating 
relationships on the outsourcing-recall relationship is a future direction of this 
research stream.   As it relates to the findings associating offshoring to recalls, future 
research should look at attributes of specific offshore locations to determine what is 
responsible for the difference in quality. Such attributes include geographic locations 
of the suppliers, physical as well as cultural distances, and physical, institutional and 
infrastructural development of the suppliers’ foreign bases.  
 This study also only looked at supply base concentration ignoring the length 
of the supply chain. There is the potential that the length of the supply chain also adds 
to its complexity and therefore may compound the negative quality effects of 






6.4.   Research Implications 
There are quite a few limitations to the study. First, data limitations restrict the study 
to only a two-year time period. A study using a panel dataset may better allow for the 
investigation of causal factors. Second, our study is limited to publicly traded firms. 
A study that can include private firms is desired to add further insights to the subject 
area since a reasonable number of recalls are made by private firms. Third, the 
Bloomberg database, which is the source for the explanatory variables, has data 
mainly on large firms.  Adding small firms to the analysis may improve the 
generalization of the findings. The outsourcing measure must be used with caution. 
The Bloomberg data indicates the firms’ headquarters which is used to operationalize 






Essay 2: Product Recall and Firm Financial Performance in 
the Consumer Product Industry 
 
1. Introduction 
Anecdotal evidence has suggested that product recalls can have devastating effect on 
firms’ performance. For instance, Toyota recalled its vehicles in 2009 and 2010 
because of serious problems with accelerator pedals and floor mats. The recalls 
resulted in costs in billions of dollars due to loss of sales, litigation fees, and image 
restoration campaigns. This effect was felt not only in the US but across the globe 
where Toyota has substantial presence in markets and supply chains (Sanchanta and 
Takahasi, 2010). In total, Toyota suffered an estimated loss of US$2 billion from 
worldwide (for example BBC 2010, Time 2010) from these recalls. Similarly, recalls 
by Mattel/Fisher Price in 2007 because of the use of lead-based paint by its paint 
suppliers and detachable magnets received significant media attention.  Mattel 
suffered losses of approximately $30 million, almost 50% of a whole quarter’s 
operating revenues of the company (Bloomberg, 2007).   
 
The limited prior research of product recalls in operations and supply chain 
management is driven by growing need for safer products, globalization of 
production, increasing complexity of products, and more monitoring by government 
agencies (Berman 1999). One would believe that, given the associated costs of recalls 
and closer scrutiny by consumers and government, firms would strive to avoid further 
recalls. In fact, prior research has shown that product recalls may serve as lessons 




(Haunschild and Rhee, 2004; Thirumalai and Sinha, 2011). However, anecdotal 
evidence also points to the contrary. For instance, Mattel/Fisher Price made over 13 
different recalls affecting millions of products between 2008 and 2011, subsequent to 
the infamous 2007 recalls discussed above.
2
  Toyota up to the end of 2012, made 
around 22 different recalls on 2010 and later models of vehicles,
3
 since the pedal 
related recalls in 2009. As stated in the media, since 2000, there has been a steady 
increase in the number of product recalls in the automobile, food, and pharmaceutical 
industries (for example, The New York Times 2011). The United States Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) recorded approximately 221 recall cases in 1988 
(Smith et al., 1996) and 8 million products and, in the last four years ending in 2011, 
the commission has recorded an average of 366 recall announcements with an 
average of 50 million affected products per year
4
.  
With increasing recalls despite the costs, the impact of recalls on firms’ 
financial performance becomes an important topic of interest.  The broad aim of this 
paper, therefore, is to investigate this impact in the consumer product sector.  
 
1.1. Recall Performance Relationship 
Product recalls have been persistent in spite of the high costs and the negative 
effects in the long term (Berman, 1999), and therefore its relationship with the firm’s 
financial performance may be complicated. The costs associated with product recalls 
can be direct, such as the cost of managing the reverse logistics, restitution, and legal 
expenses due to litigation (Berman, 1999; Rupp, 2004; Tang, 2008), or indirect such 
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3
 Calculated from the registered recalls by NHTSA 
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as loss of sales revenue and market value, (Jarrel and Peltzman, 1985; Thirumalai and 
Sinha, 2011) and brand image (Herde et al., 2007). However, ensuring product 
quality, maintaining the right supply chain partner mix, and coordinating and 
monitoring the supply chain so as to obviate recalls would also require financial 
investments and, hence, higher costs. The recall-performance relationship is, 
therefore, not as straightforward as has been presented in the extant literature. Where 
the cost of avoiding a recall outweighs the cost of the recall, itself, firms would prefer 
to have some recalls. The reverse should also be expected. Balancing between the two 
types of costs, firms may arrive at an “optimal” number of recalls: with a small 
number of recalls, all things being equal, the cost of avoiding a recall would be higher 
than would be the cost of absorbing a recall. As the recalls increase to a greater 
number, the cost of the recalls would be substantially higher. It is therefore to the best 
interest of the profit maximizing firms to endure a small number of recalls without 
incurring the higher cost associated with avoiding all recalls. By the same token, as 
recalls increase, the costs of avoiding recalls become justified with the damage of 
recalls, short- and long-term, direct and indirect, likely increasing faster. This 
reasoning does not call for elimination of recalls as has been implied by the extant 
literature, but optimization of performance and preparedness for the “inevitable 
recall” as put by Berman (1999).   
 
1.2. Recall Performance relationship moderators 
The impact of recalls on firm performance may be affected by a variety of factors. 




recall is anticipated and the cost expectations of the recall (example Dawar and 
Pillutla, 2000), and to react to the negative reaction, firms take actions that would 
have impact on financial performance. The heterogeneous nature of firms also plays a 
significant role in how recalls may be associated with firms’ financial performance. 
Firms implement sourcing and distribution strategies, such as global reach and 
emerging market penetration, which have direct quality implications with financial 
effect.  In addition, individual recall characteristics, such as recall strategy and defect 
type, may also contribute to how recalls are associated with firms’ financial 
performance. One objective of this research, therefore, is to investigate the roles of 
supply chain strategies (outsourcing and offshoring), distribution characteristics 
(global market reach and emerging market penetration), and specific recall 
characteristics (time to recall, proactive vs. reactive recalls, design vs. manufacturing 
problem source, and domestic vs. foreign made recalls) in either exacerbating or 
dampening the effect of product recalls on a recall company’s financial performance.  
1.2.1. Product recalls and financial performance relationship 
moderators: Distribution extensity 
The extent of globalization and emerging market penetration may moderate the effect 
of product recall on financial performance.  This is because both product recalls and 
globalization are associated with risk exposure of a firm, and therefore impacting on 
firm financial performance by way of neutralization of such risks. Furthermore, 
penetrating in the emerging markets adds new uncertainty to the longer supply chains 
and unpredictable markets typically found associated with globalization, and may 




Furthermore, quality standards and expectations vary across national boundaries. This 
may neutralize the recall financial performance relationship as individual country 
effects may offset one another. On the other hand however, a successful recall may be 
more difficult in a highly globalized market because of the complexity of global 
markets. This would make the recall more expensive with higher financial 
consequences.  
1.2.2. Product recalls and financial performance relationship 
moderators: sourcing attributes 
Sourcing characteristics may also moderate the recall financial performance 
relationship. Managing product recalls can be a reverse logistics management 
challenge as the products are logistically routed through all or part of the reverse 
supply chain for repairs, refund, or disposals (Hora et al., 2011). As argued earlier, 
product recalls affect a firm’s finances through costs expended on managing the 
reverse logistics and reductions in revenue from loss of sales. Supply base structures, 
such as outsourcing and offshoring or supply base concentration intensity, may affect 
the finances of a firm during a recall through both the direct costs effects and the 
indirect revenue effects. Outsourcing and offshoring or supply base diversification 
make supply chains longer and more complex, with increased numbers of hands 
touching products as they move across the supply chain nodes and across 
international boundaries (Marucheck et al., 2011). Complex and long supply chains 
may be associated with higher costs of recalls compared to simple or an in-house 
manufacturing system for the following reasons. First, a simple supply chain 




correction of product failures. Second, the physical cost of the reverse logistics may 
be higher in longer supply chains, as the recalled product may need to be sent back up 
the supply chain for repair.  Both of these actions would incur higher costs than 
would an in-house manufacturer.   
On the other hand, the reaction to recalls on the demand side (as in sales and sales 
revenues) may partly depend on the expectation of quality failures such as recalls 
(Dawar et al., 2000). A firm’s good reputation in product quality may attenuate the 
market reaction to recalls made by that firm
5
.  However, a good reputation also builds 
expectation among potential buyers of a product (Shapiro, 1983), and may therefore 
aggravate the negative market reaction to the recall of the product (Rhee and 
Haunschild, 2006).  
It is logical to think, therefore, that the extent of outsourcing, off-shoring, and 
supply base concentration, all expected to have a relationship on the costs of reverse 
logistics and quality expectations, would moderate the recall financial performance 
relationship. 
1.2.3. Product recalls and financial performance relationship 
moderators: recall specific characteristics 
 
A third set of potential moderators includes attributes of each individual recall. 
Specifically, two aspects of individual recalls, recall strategy and product defect type, 
are investigated. Recall strategies have been broadly categorized into a proactive or a 
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passive form of strategies (Siomkos and Kurzbard, 1994; Chen et al., 2009; Hora et 
al., 2011). Some firms follow a proactive strategy when filing a product recall. That 
is, when a product flaw is detected by either the firm or the quality and safety 
regulatory agencies, the firm cooperates with the agency and issues a recall early. 
These recalls are usually reported before any customer complaints or safety incidents. 
On the other hand, following a passive (reactive) recall strategy, the firm may delay 
the recall or attempt to shift responsibilities to other firms. Such a recall is usually 
filed after many consumer complaints or reports of incidents, injuries, or deaths are 
documented by the firm or the regulatory authority.  
Recall strategies firms follow may affect the firms’ short-term financial 
performance associated with recalls. On one hand, a proactive strategy may have 
positive consequences on consumer perceptions about a company’s quality standards 
and how it values its customers. Because of this positive perception, a fast response to 
a quality or safety flaw in a product may help mitigate the negative impact of the 
quality or safety failure on the firm’s financial performance (Siomkos and Kurzbard 
1994). The implications are that the firm accepts responsibility and is perceived to 
handle the recalls responsibly. Dawar and Pillutla (2000) find that the negative effect 
on brand equity are attenuated when a firm accepts the responsibility for its product 
recall and moves early enough to correct the flaws. A proactive strategy may also be 
seen as an indication of a firm’s concern for its customers, which is important to 
restore the trust and value its customers place to the firm. Furthermore, a proactive 
recall might be directly related to the cost of the reverse logistics. A fast recall stops 




recalled, preventing incidents that may require litigation, and shortening the length of 
the reverse chain. All these may lead to a lower cost of managing the recall as 
compared to a reactive recall strategy. 
On the other hand, a proactive recall may serve as a signal for a serious defect 
to the market (Chen et al., 2009) and may be interpreted as a desperate measure for 
the firm to protect itself from further exposure to the recall. This may cause 
apprehension in the market about the firm and its products, subsequently affecting 
purchase intentions and aggravating the effects of product recalls on financial 
performance. Furthermore, because firms tend to react passively to product recalls 
(Dawar and Pillutla 2000; Chen et al., 2009), proactive recalls may attract unwanted 
extra attention, resulting in more reactions (Chen et al., 2009).  
The types of defect associated with recalls, such as design flaws or 
manufacturing quality issues may further compound the impact of the recalls on a 
firm’s finances. Defect types have been identified by prior studies with an 
overwhelming portion of the defects falling in the categories of design and 
manufacturing problems (Beamish and Bapuji, 2008; Lyles et al 2008; Hora et al., 
2011). Following these studies, this research focuses on these two types of defects in 
investigating the relationship between product recalls and firms’ financial 
performance. More specifically, manufacturing defects include the use of wrong raw 
materials, such as lead base paints in toys, and defects emanating from the 
manufacturing process, such as inadequate welding together of components (Beamish 
and Bapuji, 2008). Examples include the 2007 Mattel recalls of toys for high levels of 




the start of the manufacturing process. As in the case of Mattel, an example is the 
falling magnet toy recalls of 2007. The size of the magnets, the positioning that 
enables detachment of the magnet, and swallowing by children of the detached 
magnets are design flaws. 
Recalls because of design flaws may negatively affect the firm’s finances 
more than that of a manufacturing defect for the following reasons. First, as discussed 
earlier, difficulty in traceability may compound the negative financial effect of a 
recall, and prior studies have suggested that traceability of manufacturing defects may 
be a lesser challenge than that of design defects (example Hora et al., 2011). Second, 
manufacturing is more often outsourced, while design processes are likely kept in-
house (Beamish and Bapuji, 2008). As a result, contract manufacturers tend to be 
blamed for manufacturing defects, which reduces the responsibility and financial 
punishment of the focal firms. However, for a design flaw, the firm, or the brand 
owner, is usually considered the culprit and subsequently punished by the market. 
 
To better understand product recalls, this study empirically examines the 
effects of recalls on firm’s financial performance. It contributes to the operations 
management literature as follows: 
 It is among the first works to suggest that recalls may not be all bad for 
a company’s profit margins. The research suggests that there is an 
optimal level of recalls at which profits peak. 
 It highlights the importance of global strategies such as sourcing from 




Specifically, in addition to their direct relationships with profit 
margins, such strategies are found to also moderate the effect of 
recalls on profits. 
 Sources of defects associated with recalls as well as strategies 
followed in initiating and managing recalls are also investigated. The 
recall-profit relationship is also found to depend recall strategies and 
defect types.  
The rest of this work is organized as follows. The next section, Section 2, 
reviews the related literature, which is followed by hypotheses developed from the 
literature in Section 3; data and research methodologies are outlined in Section 4. The 
results are presented and discussed in section 5 with conclusion in the last section. 
2.  Literature Review 
Product recall firm performance relationship is the most studied aspect of product 
recalls across several disciplinary boundaries. Researchers have looked at the recall 
effect on demand (Crafton et al., 1981; Reilly and Hofer, 1983), on wealth of sellers 
(Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985; Hoffer et al., 1988; Thirumalai and Sinha, 2011 etc), on 
sales (Finkelstein, 2005), on brand equity and image (Dawar and Pillutla, 2000), on 
customer-brand relationship (Aaker et al., 2004), and on advertising effectiveness 
(Herde et al., 2007).   
The earliest studies on the product recall/ performance linkage looked at demand 
reactions as well as stock market reactions to product recalls. Not surprising, these 
studies, specifically looking into automobile recalls, found a negative relationship 




1983). These results are supported by the suggestions of Finkelstein (2005) that sales 
are negatively impacted by recalls, and there is a negative stock market reaction to 
recalls (Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985; Pruitt and Peterson, 1986; Hoffer et al., 1988). 
More recent studies suggest insignificant to modest relationships between recalls and 
stock market price gyrations but confirm these classical findings for high magnitude 
recalls (Thirumalai and Sinha, 2011).  
Other performance metrics have been used and the overwhelming findings are 
that recalls have a negative effect on brand equity and on brand image (Dawar and 
Pillutla, 2000), on customer-brand relationship (Aaker et al., 2004), and on 
advertising effectiveness (Herde et al., 2007).   
More recently, moderators of the recall-performance relationship have been 
gathering interest. Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) found that the extent of market 
reaction depends on product scope, debt, and market value. Other findings along this 
line include firm reputation (Rhee and Haunschild, 2006) and advertising. 
Starting with the seminal work of Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), the literature 
linking a recall event to the wealth of shareholders have unequivocally found a 
negative impact of a recall on stock market prices (see also Hoffer et al., 1988; Chu et 
al., 2005; Chen et al., 2009 and Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). However, as stated 
earlier, the extent of the reactions may be watered down or exacerbated by other 
events or recall firm specific attributes. Along these lines, Rhee and Haunschild 
(2006) found that more reputable firms suffer more from product quality 




unintuitive result follows the expectation reasoning. Reputable firms are expected to 
produce high quality products and recalls are less expected from them than less 
reputable firms.  
Other firm characteristics have also been found to influence the extent of 
capital market reaction to product recalls. Product diversity and capital structure 
(more capital intensive) of firms have been found to lessen the negative reaction to 
recalls.  
An outsourcing and off-shoring intensive firm as well as global and emerging 
market intensive firm may have a different cost of a recall as well as different 
expectation of quality as compared to firms that insource production. Therefore, it 
stands to reason that the intensity of market reactions to product recall may vary not 
only by sourcing strategy, but also by the extent of global reach in general and 
emerging market penetration in particular. It is, therefore, a bit surprising that no prior 
work has looked at these possible moderating effect on the relationship between recall 
incident and firm financial performance and capital market reaction. This paper 
moves to fill this void in the literature. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
In this section, the recall profit relationship is developed followed by the hypothetical 
moderating effects of global and emerging market penetration, supply base structures, 





3.1. Product recall profit relationship 
Recalling a product may negatively affect the financial performance of a firm in three 
direct and directly ways (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003).  The direct effect includes 
the cost of the recall accrued through managing the reverse logistics, the cost of 
replacing the defective product, and any inventory unsold after the recall. The second 
direct effect involves lowering the recall firm’s revenues through loss of sales of the 
recalled product and any spillover effect to other products of the recalling firm. The 
third, indirect, effect, involves damages to the firm’s reputation and credibility. 
Empirical studies have found mixed results. In investigating the livestock industry, 
for instance, Marsh et al. (2004) suggested that recall events significantly affect 
demand, and that such demand response is relatively small. Even those who 
investigated the stock market reaction to product recalls, argued as a better way to 
capture both the direct and indirect effects of recalls(for example McWillaims and 
Siegel, 1997, Subramani and Walden, 2001), found inconsistent results. Some found a 
negative reaction by the stock market to a recall announcement (e.g Jarrel nad 
Peltzman, 1985) and others found little or no such effects (Hoffer et al., 1988). At the 
aggregate levels, Thirumalai and Sinha (2011) found no significant relationships. In 
addition, the impact on sales or demand is consistently negligible except for high 
magnitude recalls. Enhancing quality performance is not costless (Lundval and Juran, 
1974; Giffi et al., 1990; Hendricks and Singhal, 2000; Dresner and Xu, 1995; Steven 
et al., 2012).  The costs involve investments that include items such as training costs, 
cost of implementing new information, redeployment of resources, and other capital 




Consequently, ensuring product quality, maintaining the right supply chain partner 
mix, coordinating and monitoring the supply chain so as to obviate recalls would 
require financial investments and hence higher costs.  This view was first suggested 
by Lundval and Juran (1974) and Juran and Gryna (1980).   In developing the cost of 
quality concept, Juran and Gryna (1980) argue that there is a tradeoff between 
prevention and failure costs and, consequently, suggest that the optimal conformance 
quality level implies a positive proportion of defective products.  
Considering the fact that revenue (demand) reactions to product recalls are 
modest as indicated by the various empirical works mentioned earlier, coupled with 
the cost implications of avoiding recalls, it is reasonable to argue that firms may be 
able to attain higher financial performance with a positive number of recalls, 
especially where the cost of prevention outweighs the cost of non-conformance. 
However, the cost of recalls, which includes the cost of the reverse logistics and or 
replacement of  defective products as well as the effects on revenue and firm 
reputation, may increase disproportionately as a firm intensifies recalls (both in 
number and magnitude) as compared to the cost of preventing the recall. Even though 
firms may be able to attain higher financial performance level at some positive recall 
level, the costs of the recall may outweigh any potential cost savings from lack of 
preventive investments as a firm intensifies its recall activities. Our first hypothesis 





Hypothesis 1. The relationship between recalls and profitability is non-linear, with 
the slope positive at sufficiently low levels of recalls but negative at sufficiently high 
levels of recalls. 
3.2. Moderating influence of globalization and emerging market 
penetration on recall profit relationship 
Firm specific attributes, resources, and strategies may moderate the recall-
performance relationship. The cost of a recall to a firm comes from two sources; the 
cost of the reverse logistics and replacement cost and the market (customers and 
shareholders) reaction to the recall. Market reaction, has been argued depends among 
other factors, on the prior expectations of the firm’s performance (example Dawar 
and Pillutla, 2000). Therefore, given the heterogeneous nature of firms both in terms 
of resource strengths and reach, the impact of a recall on the firm’s profitability and 
its recovery abilities would be varied (Thirumailai and Sinha, 2011). Also, firms 
operate in different market structures and market structure has been found to 
moderate customers’ reactions to firm strategies (example Steven et al., 2012)
6
.  
Below, we identify two global strategies that affect the severity of a recall event on a 
firm’s profitability. Further, we explore the possibility of a moderating impact of 
market structure on the recall-profit relationship. Specifically, we explore the 
influence of a firm’s globalization intensity and emerging market penetration on the 
impact of a recall incident on a firm’s profit.   
Globalization intensity may moderate the recall-profit relationship. The 
direction of the moderation effect is not very straightforward. Whereas geographic 
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diversification can create operational slack (Huchzermeier and Cohen 1996; 
Allayannis et al., 2001), it can also compound supply chain complexity (Craighead et 
al., 2007). The extent of the impact of a recall on firm performance may depend on 
how well the event is anticipated or expected by the market (Jarrel and Peltzman, 
1985, Dawar and Pillutla, 2000) and the cost of the recall.  
Highly globalized firms are able to spread the risk and, thus, the financial 
consequence of a supply chain glitch across international boundaries. Given that 
different countries have different expected quality standards from companies, 
consumers may react differently across the globe. This would benefit globalized firms 
during recalls.  
On the other hand, an intensively internationalized firm may incur more cost 
in the reverse logistics because of the number of hands that are involved in the supply 
chain and the fact that extended supply chains are more complex (Craighead et al., 
2007), and consequently, have less visibility and more difficult traceability. Because 
of the complexity of global supply chains, recovery from supply chain disruptions 
may take longer and suffer more economic damage (e.g.Rice and Caniato, 2003; 
Stauffer 2003; Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Tang, 2006; and Deloitte Consulting, 2007).  
This cost of recalls of highly globalized firms may impact profits more negatively as 
compared to less internationalized intensive firms. 
However, the latter effect is supported in prior works like Hendricks et al., 
(2009) in their study of stock market reaction to supply chain disruption 




globalization outweighs the slack effect. Therefore, our next hypothesis is given as 
thus: 
 
Hypothesis 2. The extent of globalization negatively moderates the curvilinear recall-
profit relationship.  
 
Similar to global intensity, emerging market penetration may positively or negatively 
moderate the recall-profit relationship. Many emerging market infrastructures are 
either poor or fledging, as demonstrated by lack of or poor highway systems, 
inadequate warehousing facilities, and poor or over congested ports. In addition, 
fledging technological infrastructure and limited use of advance supply chain 
management systems makes visibility and traceability difficult. Further, Lyles et al., 
(2008) suggest that emerging economies’ supply chains are very deep
7
 or very 
complex. Extending the normal supply chains spanning suppliers to retailers, 
contractors in emerging markets also often subcontract to other contactors, often 
unknowingly to their principals, adding to the complexity of the supply chain. These 
arrangements would compound the cost of recalls and, consequently, impact profits 
more negatively.  Also, institutional infrastructure, including legislation or regulations 
and policies and the implementation, and enforcement of rules and regulations 
hinders compliance to contractual policies. These complex policies and regulations 
would make the coordination of the reverse logistics difficult and more costly. All 
these would affect profits negatively when there is a recall.  
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On the other hand, firms selling in emerging markets also have unique 
advantages that may reduce the effect of recalls on profits.  First, having endured poor 
customer service standards in the past, consumers in emerging markets may be less 
sensitive to product quality and product quality glitches than their counterparts in 
developed countries. Second, just as globalized firms, firms with high emerging 
market penetration are able to spread the risk of quality failures and thus the financial 
consequence of a supply chain glitch across emerging markets that may have lower 
quality expectations and standards.  
However, as argued in the case of globalization, the complexity created by 
emerging market penetration, coupled with the weak infrastructure and institutional 
entities like legislation, the negative effect of emerging market penetration when there 
is a product recall may outweigh any positive effect.  The next hypothesis is thus: 
 
Hypothesis 3. The extent of emerging market penetration negatively moderates the 
curvilinear recall-profit 
 
3.3. The moderating role of outsourcing, off-shoring and supply base 
concentration on the relationship between recalls and financial 
performance 
Firms are different in attributes as well as their sourcing strategies and, consequently, 
have different capacities in handling shocks. It is, therefore, logical to argue that the 
severity of the impact of a recall on a firm would vary across firms and be dependent 




products and the impact on cost of a recall may vary by the extent of outsourcing and 
offshoring intensity and the dispersal of the supply base of a firm.  
The outsourcing and offshoring structure of a firm is one of these sourcing 
attributes that may moderate the intensity of the impact of a recall on firm value. On 
one hand, the general public expectation, recently backed up by few academic 
research results (e.g. Gray et al., 2011), is that products made by contract 
manufacturers and or abroad are of lower quality than products produce in the US. 
Consequently, a quality failure of an outsourced or off-shored product would not be 
of a shock to the market as compared to a quality failure of in-house or in-shore 
products. Therefore, the severity of the market reaction to a recall by a firm with high 
outsourcing and or offshoring intensity would be less than those by a firm with lower 
offshoring intensity controlling for the broader effect of outsourcing which subsumes 
offshoring. On the other hand, an intensively outsourced or offshored firm may incur 
more cost in the reverse logistics because of the number of hands that are involved in 
the supply chain and the fact that extended supply chains are more complex affecting 
visibility and traceability. This cost effect will impact financial performance 
negatively even if the market does not negatively react through their purchase 
intentions. This leads to the next two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 4. The extent of outsourcing negatively moderates the curvilinear recall-
profit relationship. 






The complex and globalized supply chains, resulting from outsourcing and 
offshoring, often involve a large number of suppliers. Mattel had 37 certified 
suppliers and hundreds of others in China alone in 2007 (Bapuji and Beamish 2008). 
The distribution of the suppliers directly affects the visibility of the supply chains, as 
a large number of small suppliers may make communication and information sharing 
in the supply chains more difficult.  
Diversifying the supply base could lead to supply chains with “upstream 
complexity” (Choi et al., 2001; Wu and Choi 2005; Bozarth et al. 2009). Supply chain 
complexity can lead to high costs of coordination (Denis et al., 2002) leading to high 
costs of the reverse logistics during recalls. From the perspective of TCE on quality, 
more specifically, supply base complexity may implicitly increase the costs of 
identifying quality problems by making traceability much more difficult.  As Bozarth 
et al., (2009) argued, the number of suppliers is associated with increased information 
and physical flows and greater numbers of relationships to be managed. Equally, the 
reverse logistics may require increased information and physical flows as the number 
of suppliers increases. In addition, a concentrated supply chain should enable 
visibility and traceability, leading to early detection of production and supply chain 
issues.  
Another potential moderator is supplier diversification across geographic 
regions. Even though there is little literature on the effects of global sourcing on 
recall performance relationship, the broader context of globalization can offer some 
insights. Geographic diversification, in effect, would inhibit inventory visibility and 




and Caniato, 2003; Stauffer 2003; Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Tang 2006; Deloitte 
Consulting, 2007). Also, most complexity constructs defined by many academics 
have included measures of both supply base concentration and geographic 
diversification of suppliers. The number of suppliers has been identified as a 
complexity driver (Choi et al., 2001; Wu and Choi, 2005; Goffin et al., 2006; Bozarth 
et al., 2009) as well as the extent of globalization of the supply base (Cho and Kang, 
2001; Nellore et al., 2001; Bozarth et al., 2009). Supply chain visibility and 
traceability can be much more difficult across many suppliers and across international 
boundaries as supply chains become diverse and global (e.g. Rice and Caniato, 2003; 
Stauffer 2003; Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Tang 2006; Tohmatsu, 2007).  
Specifically, a more concentrated supplier may ease a firm’s effort in 
coordination the recall process, leading to lower transaction costs involved in such 
effort.  Consequently, supplier concentration may mitigate the negative relationship 
between product recalls and financial performance. 
Hypothesis 6. Supply base concentration positively moderates the curvilinear recall-
profit relationship. 
Hypothesis 7. National supply base concentration positively moderates the 
curvilinear recall-profit relationship. 
3.4. The moderating role of recall strategy and defect type on the 
relationship between recalls and financial performance 
Recall strategy may affect a firm’s finances during a recall. As argued in the 
introduction, a proactive strategy may have a positive consequence on consumer 




safety flaw in a product may help mitigate the negative impact of the quality or safety 
failure on the firm’s financial performance because of the positive perceptions it 
creates on consumers (Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994). The implications are that the 
firm accepts responsibility and is perceived to handle the recalls responsibly. 
Furthermore, a proactive recall might be directly related to the cost of the reverse 
logistics. A fast recall slows down the distribution of the product limiting the number 
of the products to be recalled, preventing incidents that may require litigation, and 
shortening the length of the reverse chain. All these may lead to a lower cost of 
managing the recall as compared to a reactive recall. 
However, a proactive recall may serve as a signal to the market for a serious 
defect (Chen et al., 2009). This may cause apprehension in the market about the firm 
and its products with a negative impact on purchase intentions and, consequently, 
aggravating the negative effects of product recalls on financial performance. Further, 
firms overwhelmingly react passively to product recalls (Dawar and Pillutla 2000; 
Chen et al., 2009). This may lead to more attention given to rare proactive recalls, 
resulting in more negative reactions (Chen et al., 2009). An example is the coverage 
the Mattel recalls of 2007 got for lead base paints and detachable magnets. In both 
cases, the recalls were made prior to any incidents and fast enough to be called a 
proactive recall strategy. Mattel however, reported an almost 50% loss in sales 
revenues due to these recalls (Bloomberg, 2007). Proactive recalls may therefore lead 
to more financial losses as compared to a more passive recall.  
 






There are reasons to suggest that recalls related to design flaws may hurt the 
firm’s finances more than that of a manufacturing related defect. First, as argued 
earlier, difficulty in traceability may compound the negative financial effect of a 
recall. Prior works have suggested that traceability of manufacturing defects may be 
easier and faster than that of design defects (example Hora et al., 2011). Two 
explanations are given; common sourcing by a firm wherein more than product uses 
the same raw material or component and contract manufacturers or suppliers actually 
supplying other firms. Because of the difficulty in tracing sources of defects when the 
defects are design related, more cost may be incurred during the recall. Second, most 
manufacturing is outsourced, while designing processes are kept in-house (Beamish 
and Bapuji, 2008). Because of this reason, the market may blame the contract 
manufacturers more for a manufacturing related recall. Indeed, firms always try shift 
blames and limit damages on their reputation when there is a product crisis like a 
recall (Rhee and Valdez, 2009). For example Mattel, in announcing the toy recalls 
due to lead paint hazard, the firm stated that some of its manufacturers “violated 
Mattel’s policies” and used paint from a non-authorized third-party suppliers (Tang, 
2008). 
 





4. Model Development 
In this section, we develop econometric models to test the above hypotheses. The 
modeling framework is based on the relationships between product recalls and firm 
profitability. The underlying hypothesis is that there is a negative overall effect of 
recalls and firm finances but such a relationship is non-linear. Furthermore, additional 
moderating effects on this relationship are also examined. Specifically, the 
moderating roles of a firm’s global reach, sourcing structure, and recall strategy are 
investigated. Recall intensity is expected to have negative quadratic relationship with 
profits (H1) and intensity in global reach, outsourcing, and offshoring is expected to 
worsen the negative effect of recalls on financial performance (H2 through H5). Also, 
supply base concentration is predicted to dampen the negative effect of recalls on 
performance (H6 and H7) and proactive recalls and design flaws are expected to lead 
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4.1. Empirical Model 
As there are three sets of moderators in the essay, the empirical models are also 
subdivided into three subsections. The reason for the three models is that three 
different sets of data from different sources are used for the analysis, one for each 
model. The first subsection outlines the proposed recall performance relationship and 
the moderating roles of emerging market and global market reach (Hypotheses 1 
through 3). The second empirical model tries to capture the effects of sourcing 
structures (Hypotheses 4 through 7). The third model exemplifies the effects of recall 
strategy and defect type on the recall profit relationship (Hypotheses 8 and 9).  
Internationalization/emerging 
market penetration 
















4.1.1. Recall Profit Relationship (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3) 
As argued earlier, a firm’s recall incident may be associated with its profit 
performance via an inverted U-shaped relationship. This relationship may vary by 
firm according to their global and emerging market penetration intensity.  An 
econometric model is, therefore, proposed that captures this relationship as well as the 
moderating effects of global reach and emerging market penetration. Since there are 
many other factors that may affect firms’ profitability, control variables are, therefore 
included in the analysis to control for effects that otherwise may interfere with the 
predictions of our main explanatory variables.  
 













 Profit is the dependent variable 
 Recall, the main independent variable, is the number of recalls per firm per 
year. This variable is alternated with a recall intensity variable aimed to 
capture the magnitude of recalls. Firms may observe no negative impact on 
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profits or they might be able to improve profits at some non-zero recall 
number, when the cost of preventing recalls outweighs the failure cost. 
Alternatively, recalls may have a negative relationship with profits, when the 
recall cost outweighs the costs of preventing recalls. There may also be a 
curvilinear association between recalls and profits, with profits increasing 
when recalls are at a low frequency and decreasing when recalls are more 
frequent, as described in Hypothesis 1. A square term of the recall variable is, 
therefore, included in the model to capture this effect. 
 Emerging markets, as defined earlier, is a variable that measures the extent to 
which firms sell in emerging markets. This variable is interacted with the 
recall variable to capture its moderating impact on the recall-profit 
relationship 
 Global intensity is a variable that measures the extent of global presence of a 
firm. This variable is interacted with the recall variable to capture its 
moderating effect on the recall-profit relationship. 
 Inventory is a control variable to capture the inventory profit relationship. 
Inventory may have a positive relationship with profit, as it is a measure of 
service levels. On the other hand, inventories may have a negative impact on 
profit, as they incur costs as well as represent tied up capital. Inventory may 
also have a curvilinear relationship with profits. Profits maybe increasing 
when inventory levels are lower than optimal and may be decreasing when 
inventory levels are above optimal. Therefore, a squared term is introduced in 




 Both firm and industry effects are included as control variables in the model. 
Three-digit North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes 
are used to classify industry sectors. In North America, industry sectors are 
classified primarily based on production processes and technologies, both of 
which may affect product quality, recalls, and profitability.  We include these 
industry-specific variables to control for other omitted industry-specific 
attributes that influence profitability.  
 Capital intensity is a control variable that may be associated with firm 
performance. 
 Rd is a measure of R&D intensity and is a control variable in the model. This 
variable may reflect a firm’s innovative capability and may be associated with 
a firm’s quality performance. The R&D efforts of a firm may reduce the 
chances of a quality failure, and, hence, lead to lower recalls. On the other 
hand, higher R&D intensity may also indicate the firm’s focus on innovation 
and new product development, which may increase the likelihood of errors 
and, thus, positively affects recalls. 
 Prior recall is a control variable aimed at capturing the effect of organizational 
learning. Recall events may “trigger renewed attention to the weak links in the 
process and foster research toward improving the existing operations by 
bringing new information and resources” (Thirumalai and Sinha, 2011, p. 
381). As such, prior recalls made by firms may lead to efforts that mitigate 




 Firm size is used as a control variable. Firm size maybe positively associated 
with recalls, as larger firms have usually more diversified product base and 
are, therefore, more complex. 
 Employee is a control variable that measures labor per unit of output. We 
control for this because the chances of human error may increase with 
increased use of labor. 
 
4.1.2. Recall Profit relationship: the moderating effects of supply 
base structure (H4-H7) 
In the each of the three models of the analysis, the dependent variable is financial 
performance (specifically profits) but in this model, the explanatory variables are the 
outsourcing and offshoring intensity, supplier and national concentration. As argued 
earlier, outsourcing domestically and internationally affects both the quality 
expectations of products and the costs of reverse logistics during recalls as well as 
supplier and national concentrations. Therefore, each of these variables is expected to 
play a moderating role on the recall performance relationship. An econometric model 
is, therefore, proposed that captures these effects.  





























 Outsource is one of the key independent variables. It measures the extent to 
which firms source from outside the firm as opposed to making sub-
components and products in-house.  
 Offshore is the second explanatory variable of interest. It measures the extent 
to which firms’ source internationally. 
 Suppliercon is supplier concentration which measures the extent to which a 
firm concentrates its purchases among a limited number of suppliers or 
diversifies its purchases among a number of suppliers.. 
 Natcon is the extent to which a firm concentrates its purchases among 
suppliers located in across different countries. 
All other variables are defined as earlier under equation 1.  
 
4.1.3. Recall Profit relationship: the moderating effects of recall 
strategy and defect type (H8-H9) 
In the third model of the analysis, the main explanatory variables are the recall 
strategy and defect type of individual recalls. Both recall strategy and the source of 
the defect leading to a recall may influence a firm’s profits when there is a recall. 
Recall strategy as well as the source of defect prompting a recall may play into 
consumers’ perceptions about a firm and costs of reverse logistics during recalls. 
Therefore, each of these variables is expected to play a moderating role on the recall 
performance relationship. An econometric model is, therefore, proposed that captures 
these effects.  







 proactive is a measure of proactive strategy recalls employed by a firm in a 
year 
 design is a measure of recalls due to design flaws in a year 
 
All other variables are as previously defined. 
 
4.2. Data and data sources 
Three different sets of data are used to test the hypothesized relationships. 
Hypotheses 1 through 3 establish the relationships between recalls and performance, 
along with the moderating influences of emerging and global market reach, and are 
tested using one data set. All hypotheses relating to the firms’ supply base structure 
and performance relationships (Hypotheses 4 through 8) are tested using a second set 
of data, while hypotheses relating to recall specific variables are testes using a third 
data set (Hypotheses 8 and 9).  
4.2.1. Global intensity, emerging market penetration intensity, recall-
profit relationship data set (Model 1) 
 
To test the hypotheses in Model 1, we make use of a panel data on public 
manufacturing firms, including information on their profits, their market 
characteristics, and the recalls made by each individual firm. By using archival, 
objective data in this analysis rather than survey responses to a measurement 



















perceptions and or attitudes.  Indeed, such a reliance may lead to biases in the 
variables or inaccurate information (Goffin et. Al 2006).  
This investigation is limited to public firms within the US manufacturing 
sector. The study is done on recalls that fall within the jurisdiction of the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
9
. The sample comprises of public US 
manufacturing firms for obvious reasons. As stated earlier, first, the research is about 
product recalls and the sector that may have more control or influence over their 
product quality and safety decisions is the manufacturing sector. A second obvious 
reason is the availability of data on public firms. Since public firms are required to 
make many disclosures, access to a well representative data is easier compared to 
private firms that are not required to make such disclosures.  
Testing the first three hypotheses developed above requires information on 
product recalls, firm characteristics, geographic diversity intensity, and the profit 
performances of firms. Data are drawn from two key sources: the Compustat data 
base accessed through the Wharton Research Data services (WRDS) and the US 
consumer product safety commission’s (CPSC).   
To test the first hypothesis, information on recalls made by individual firms 
and corresponding profit performance measures are required. First, the recall data are 
collected from US consumer product safety commission’s (CPSC) recall 
announcements between 2005 and 2012, an 8 year period. CPSC records all recall 
announcements, voluntary or mandated, of all consumer products. This information 
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includes the quantity recalled, the average product prices, the type of recall (voluntary 
or mandatory), and information on whether the faulty product has resulted in any 
incidences. The data are used to get the number of recalls each firm makes within our 
period of observation, along with additional information to be used for subsequent 
analysis.  
Information on profits is gathered from the Compustat data base for the same 
8 year-period 2005 through 2011. The data collection started by compiling all recalls 
from the CPSC recall data between 2005 and 2011. All public firms were then 
identified independently by four individuals through a manual process. The 6 digit 
NAICS code was then collected for all the public firms falling within the 
manufacturing sector 311-339. These  NAICS codes were then used to derive 
information on all firms from the Compustat data base.   
 
Data were collected on all on 6 digit NAICS code ranging from 311111 to 
339999 that have made recall announcements falling within the CPSC agency’s 
jurisdiction. For instance, NAICS codes 336111 and 32541, automobile 
manufacturing and pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing, whose jurisdiction 
lies outside the CPSC‘s authority, were not included in the analyses. In all, after 
collapsing the industries at the three digit NAICS code levels, only 10 industries fall 
under the CPSC within the manufacturing sector, at the 3 NAICS digit levels . 
Detailed description and representation of these 10 industries are given in Table 1. 
Information of profits and the control variables were then matched with the recall 




To test these three hypotheses, in addition to the recall and profit performance 
information, data are required on firms’ global and emerging market reach.  Annual 
data for global intensity and emerging market sales were collected from the 
COMPUSTAT segment database, which reports a firm’s annual sales breakdown by 
product segments and by geographic segments. This data are extracted for all 
manufacturing firms by 6 digit NAICS code as explained earlier and used for the 
construction of both the global intensity and emerging market penetration measures. 
The construction of individual variables is explained below. Using a firm’s permanent 
identifier (GVKEY), defined by COMPUSTAT to track a firm over time even if the 
company name or ticker changes over time, we then match global intensity and 
emerging market penetration data with firm financial and recall data developed as 
explained above. Individual variable computations are explained below. 
 
4.2.2. Moderating effects of outsourcing, offshoring and supply base 
concentration on recall-profit relationship data set 
To test hypotheses 4 through 7 (model 2), we make use of a cross sectional data on 
public manufacturing firms, including information on their relationships with 
suppliers as well as their buyers, the strength of these relationships, the recalls made 
by each individual firm, and firm specific characteristics, including measures of 
profits.  
As stated earlier, this investigation is limited to public firms within the US 
manufacturing sector. The sample comprises of public US manufacturing firms for 




that faces that decision most is the manufacturing sector. Other sectors, like retail, 
almost always depend on secondary firms for their production needs. No doubt, large 
retailers like Wal-Mart and Target play a critical role in the goods market in the US 
economy, for instance, and possess and exercise significant power over their chain 
members. However, since they are not faced with decisions to make or to buy, 
outsourced internally or offshore, they would not be appropriate sample for this 
analysis. The second obvious reason is the availability of data on public firms. Since 
public firms are required to make many disclosures, access to a well representative 
data base is easier compared to data access from private firms who are not required to 
make such disclosures.  
Data for this analysis were gathered from three different sources. The main 
hypotheses revolve around outsourcing and offshoring and their interaction impacts 
on firm recall-performance relationship, as measured by profits. As in the first model, 
the performance data comes from the Compustat data base and the main explanatory 
variable, the recall variable, comes from CPSC recall data base. 
The third data source is the Supply Chain data from the Bloomberg data base. 
The explanatory variables, outsourcing intensity, offshoring intensity and supplier 
and national concentration are collected from the Bloomberg data base. This data set 
is limited and applicable only to 2010 and 2011, a two year period. Bloomberg offers 
data on supply chain relationships for about 35,000 firms. The data maps a company 
to its suppliers, customers as well as its competitors and gives indication of the 
strength of the dyadic relationship between any two firms. The supply chain data 




(revenue) and supplier (cost) basis. It gives estimates of the percentage of a supplier’s 
revenue for instance, that comes from a buyer and a percentage of a buyers cost of 
goods sold that is spent on an individual supplier. Bloomberg uses three different 
methods to compile this data. The first, termed the “mathematical method,” derives 
the supply chain relationship from public data as well as from information obtained 
from the companies directly. The second, Bloomberg’s own algorithm, quantifies 
relationships based on defined parameters, where no quantified data exists. With the 
third approach, Bloomberg purchases proprietary data from other sources. Excerpts of 
the data description by Bloomberg as well as a screen shot of the supply chain data is 
given in the appendix. 
Because the Bloomberg data is limited to a two year period 2010 and 2011, 
data were collected on firms from the Compustat and the CPSC data bases for only 
these two years. Data were collected on all 6 digit NAICS code ranging from 311112 
to 339999, except for 336111, as explained earlier. These data were then matched 
with the Bloomberg data by company name to get a unique data set of about 377 
observations for 190 different firms. Recall announcements were then gathered for 
these 190 firms from the CPSC data base. We are, therefore, able to have firms with 
zero recalls within our study period and firms with as many as 4 independent recalls. 







4.2.3. Moderating effects of recall strategy and defect type on recall-
profit relationship data set (Model 3) 
To test hypotheses 8 and 9 (model 3), a cross sectional database on public 
manufacturing firms was drawn from the CPSC and the Compustat databases. Only 
firms with recalls within the 2005 to 2012 time period are considered. The focus for 
this database is on specific recall attributes. As a result, the analysis is limited to those 
public manufacturing firms who have made at least one recall in the eight year period 
under review. The recall specific variables, the recall strategy and defect type, are 
both generated from the CPSC recall announcements. The CPSC recall 
announcements contain information used to generate the explanatory variables. The 
CPSC recall announcements include: 1) recall date, 2) the number of units recalled or 
defected, 3) description of the hazard, 4) the recalling company, 5) number and types 
of incidents, 6) the average price, 7) country of manufacture, 8) the date the product 
was first sold in the market and 9) pictures of the product recalled. This information 
was used and paired with data on the specific firms from Compustat to get a data set 
for this analysis. Detailed variable description and calculation is given in the next 
section.   
4.3. Measures of variables 
Financial performance is operationalized as profits margins across all three models.   
Short term financial performance, which is the interest of this research is best 
characterized by profit margins. The profit variable is computed as the difference 










Recall, the major independent variable in all three model sets is a count 
variable. The number of independent recalls will be used as the independent variable 
to test the hypothesized relationship between recalls and performance. An alternative 
measure for the recall variable is the value of the recalls. This is calculated as the 
quantity of products recalled, or affected by the recall, multiplied by the average 
price, as given in the CPSC recall announcement. This product is then divided by 
sales to get a recall intensity measure. In cases where a firm made more than one 
recall, the magnitudes are calculated individually for each product and then summed 




















4.3.1. Globalization, emerging market penetration intensity measures 
 
The globalization measure is sub-divided into two parts aimed at capturing the spread 
of a firm’s sales across international boundaries/geographic regions in addition to the 













extent to which a firm’s product penetrates the global market is measured as 1 minus 
the sum of the squared share of sales in each geographic region, following the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  This measure has been extensively used as a 








kX intensitynalizationInternatio  
Where X is the share of sales in each geographic region and P is the total number of 
regions. A value of 1, which is possible when the second term nears zero, indicates 
that a firm is present in infinite number of countries and as the value approaches zero, 
the number of regions the firm operates in approaches one.  Global sales intensity, 
which measures the extent of a firm’s reliance on the global market, is measured as 







Emerging market penetration is calculated as the ratio of the sum of sales generated 







marketemerging   
 
To construct the global and emerging market variables, data is extracted from 
the COMPUSTAT segment data base which reports annual sales breakdown by 
region, product, and even states. The data were then cleaned by going through the 




firms list US, USA, United States, United States of America etc. If the entropies are 
calculated without correcting these, each name would be recognized as a separate 
region. The same procedure is followed for all of the regions. These data were then 
used first to calculate the globalization entropy. Subsequently, a firm’s emerging 
market sales was identified using a list of emerging economies derived from the 
literature. . The following list of countries was used to identify the emerging markets: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey (Han et al., 2012). These 
data were then matched with the performance-recall data.  
 
4.3.2. Sourcing structure; outsourcing, offshoring and supply base 
concentration measures 
 
Outsourcing intensity was measured as the percentage of a firm’s cost of goods sold 
(COGS) that are expended on its suppliers as given in the Bloomberg data. The larger 







Offshoring intensity similarly, was measured as the percentage of a firm’s COGS 
expended on foreign firms. Foreign firms were defined as firms registered or 







Supplier concentration was measured as the sum of squared cost of goods sold 
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Where S is the share of COGS expended on firm i and N is the total number of 
suppliers. A value of 1 indicates that a firm has only one supplier and a value 
approaching zero indicates that the number of suppliers approaches infinity.  
National concentration is calculated as the sum of squared cost of goods sold by 
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Where X is the total share of COGS expended on suppliers in country j (the firm’s 
domicile country) and M is the total number of suppliers. Similarly, a value of 1 
implies that all of a firm’s suppliers are domiciled in 1 country.  
 
4.3.3. Recall strategy, defect type measures 
 
The CPSC recall announcements contain information that is used to operationalize 
the recall strategy as well as the defect type. Specific information is given on 1) recall 
date, 2) number and types of incidents, 3) the date the product was first sold in the 
market, and 4) description of the defect or hazard that resulted in the recall. This 
information was used to compute the two key explanatory variables in the third 
model.   
 The first of the two key explanatory variables specific to individual recalls 
under investigation is the recall strategy. As discussed earlier, only two strategies are 




variable. First, the CPSC recalls clearly state the number of reported incidents, if any, 
by the recall time, including injuries or deaths associated with the recalled product. 
The reasoning is that if there is no report of any incident prior to the recall, then the 
firm moved proactively to manage the defects. On the other hand, if a recall is made 
after reports of incidents, this suggests a more passive strategy by the firm (Chen et 
al., 2009). The number or sum of incidents in a year is, therefore, used. This captures 
both the strategy and the extent to which the firm waits to make the recall.  
A second measure is a variable measuring the “time to recall” (Hora et al., 
2011). The rationale is that a firm, employing a proactive strategy, may move quickly 
to recall a defective product. Secondly, as the time to recall a product that is defective 
lengthens, the chances of incidents, including injuries or deaths increases. The two 
different measures, therefore, effectively capture the effects of the recall management 
strategy a firm adapts in handling a recall. This variable, time to recall, is estimated as 
the difference between the date the product entered the market as reported by the 
CPSC and the announcement date of product recall (Hora et al., 2011). Since there 
may be more than 1 recall in a year, the sum of these differences between recall time 
and the time the product was first sold are used. Alternatively, the averages are used 
as well. 
The second explanatory variable here is the type of product defect associated 
with the recalled product. As explained earlier, the CPSC, under the heading 
“description of the hazard,” explains the defects associated with the recall. 
Categorizing the product defect therefore, was done by carefully analyzing the 




before manufacturing is begun. They include defects like size, position and type of 
components, such as small detachable parts like the magnets in toys, button eyes and 
beads, or the use of strings leading to strangulation or entrapment. Manufacturing 
defects result from the manufacturing process. They include use of toxic materials 
such as high lead content paint in toys, faulty assembly or improper welding, or the 
use of substandard component parts (Beamish and Bapuji, 2008). This information 
was used to code each recall, as either a design or a manufacturing related defect 
type. The coding was done independently by four graduate students and a professor 
with extensive knowledge in quality issues. Three of the coders were not directly 
related to the study. There was a small percentage (less than 6 %) of the time when 
the coders were unable to classify a recall into any of the two categories. These were 
dropped from the final analysis. The consistency of the coding gives sufficient 
confidence that helps deem it as reliable (Beamish and Bapuji, 2008).  Each defect 
was then coded as a categorical variable, with design flaw coded as 1 and 
manufacturing defect coded as 0. However, our studies are at firm-year level and not 
at an event level. Therefore, a ratio is created to capture the percentage of design or 
manufacturing flaws in a year per firm. For example, if a firm made 5 recalls in a 
year, and 3 of those recalls are coded as design, the variable design is then 3/5, which 
is 0.6. From our hypothesis, the interaction between this variable and the recall 
variable should have a negative sign. That is the more design flaws a firm has, the 





4.3.4. Control variables 
Like the dependent and the key explanatory variable, recalls, the same set of control 
variables are used in all three different models. These are inventory, R&D intensity, 
capital expenditure intensity, and sales which is a proxy for size. R & D and capital 
intensity are both measured by a firm’s research and development expenditure and 
capital expenditure respectively normalized by sales. 









Assuming 365-day year 
Firm size is measured by firm sales and time. Both industry and firm dummy 
variables are included in all models to capture both industry and firm effects. 
4.4. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are also given in three subsections representing the three 
different models respectively. 
4.4.1. Descriptive statistics: Global extensity and intensity, emerging 
market penetration intensity 
Firm emerging market, global presence characteristics, along with the distribution of 
firms by industry are given in Table 1.  Table 2 provides overall descriptive statistics.  
From Table 1, it can be seen that firms from the computer and electronics 
manufacturing sector (334) account for about 40% of the firm-years of observations, 
while firms from the furniture manufacturing industries (337) are least represented, 
with slightly more than 1% of the observations. In terms of emerging market 




have penetrated emerging markets the most (24% of total sales), followed by food 
manufacturing (20%). On the other hand, firms in the furniture (2%), followed by 
other durables firms (3%), have the least emerging market penetration. 




















extensity recall profit 
311 150 24 0.2 0.32 0.36 0.13 3644 
322 147 28 0.08 0.44 0.29 0.03 1638 
325 1640 331 0.1 0.36 0.37 0.03 2336 
332 131 22 0.09 0.43 0.25 0.11 701 
333 583 99 0.06 0.5 0.26 0.14 1151 
334 3447 628 0.24 0.54 0.27 0.02 755 
335 311 59 0.12 0.34 0.32 0.08 361 
336 529 85 0.08 0.4 0.28 0.15 3721 
337 94 15 0.02 0.29 0.36 0.29 478 
339 729 142 0.03 0.32 0.33 0.31 554 
 Average 
(*Totals) 7761* 1433* 0.16 0.45 0.3 0.06 1353 
+ 
Industry definitions are given in Appendix B 
With respect to geographic locations or globalization, most industries are 
fairly concentrated in terms of their sales activity. The most concentrated are firms in 
the food, chemical, and furniture industries, all selling to an equivalent of three 
countries with approximately equal shares. In contrast, the least concentrated is the 
fabricated metals (332) sector, selling to an equivalent of four countries with 
approximately equal shares. Similarly, almost all industries are active in foreign 
markets for their sales. For industries in the electronics sector, over 50% of their sales 
on average come from foreign markets. At the opposite end, only 29% of sales come 
from foreign markets on average for firms in furniture industry (337). The highest 




and 0.31 per firm over the seven year period, followed by transportation equipment 
industry (336).  
The mean emerging market penetration intensity for all firms is 15% of sales 
(Table 2). All firms have a mean of 0.26 recalls per firm year and the maximum 
number of recalls for an individual firm during the analysis period is 13.  
  Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
variable mean sd min max 
global intensity 0.45 0.37 0 1 
global extensity 0.30 0.23 0.03 1 
emerging market 
penetration 0.16 0.48 0 0.94 
recall 0.26 0.46 0 13 
Gross profit 1352.54 4874.08 -426.092 62482 
 
4.4.2. Descriptive statistics: Sourcing structure; outsourcing, offshoring 
and supply base concentration 
Firm sourcing characteristics and the distribution of firms by industry are given in 
Table 3 and overall descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4. 

















311 24 0.272 0.342 0.004 0.292 7104 
322 12 0.2 0.331 0.006 0.083 5315 
325 74 0.235 0.332 0.038 0.324 9385 
332 12 0.23 0.393 0.017 0.25 1526 
333 36 0.406 0.304 0.013 0.306 3333 
334 97 0.63 0.349 0.076 0.092 4961 
335 8 0.108 0.271 0.001 0.25 2358 
336 45 0.55 0.356 0.031 0.133 3109 
337 2 0.009 0.259 0 0.5 849 
339 18 0.285 0.325 0.01 0.278 2745 
+





From Table 3, it can be seen that firms from the computer and electronics 
manufacturing sector account for about 25% of the firm-years of observations, while 
firms from the leather and nonmetallic manufacturing industries are least represented 
with less than 1% of the observations each. In terms of outsourcing, firms with 
operations in computer and electronics manufacturing outsource the most (63% of 
COGS), followed by firms in the transportation equipment sector (55%). On the other 
hand, firms in the leather industry sector (<1%), followed by nonmetallic industry 
firms (1%) have the least outsourcing intensity. With respect to geographic locations 
(national), most industries are fairly concentrated in terms of their sourcing behavior. 
The most concentrated are firms in the petroleum industry, sourcing from an 
equivalent of three countries, each with approximately equal shares. The least 
concentrated sectors are plastics and rubber, each with an equivalent of 10 ten 
countries, each with approximately equal. On the contrary, almost all industries are 
quite spread out in terms of suppliers. The most concentration of suppliers, however, 
is for firms in the computer and electronics sector. The highest recalls are for firms in 
the furniture industry sector, with an average of 0.5 recalls per firm over the two year 
period, followed by firms in the chemical industry sector.  
The mean outsourcing intensity for all firms is 17% of cost of goods sold 
(Table 4), with a mean of 0.188 recalls per firm year and a maximum recalls of four 








Table 4 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outsource 328 0.179 0.232 0 0.855 
Offshore 328 0.087 0.156 0 0.553 
National 
concentration 328 0.339 0.139 0.117 0.722 
Supplier 
concentration 328 0.038 0.081 0 0.423 
Recall 328 0.188 0.535 0 4 
Profit 328 5360 9225 16.97 56596 
R&D 
intensity  328 0.063 0.066 0.001 0.33 
Capital 
intensity 328 0.041 0.037 0.007 0.308 
Size (Sales) 328 12437 16698 52 108249 
 
 
4.4.3. Descriptive statistics: Recall strategy and defect type 
 
A total of 411 firm-year observations are included in this part of the study of 106 
unique firms. It includes only firms who made recalls and only years that the specific 
firm made a recall. The distribution by industry is given in Table 5 and the descriptive 
statistics are given in Table 6. The most represented industry sector is the machinery 
sector, with 25 firms followed by the computer and electronics sectors. The most 
recalls, however, are in the other durables industry sector, which includes toy 
manufacturers. In terms of the value of recalls, recalls in transportation equipment 
industry sector have the highest value, followed by firms in the computer and 
electronics and electrical equipment sectors, respectively. On average, recalls lagged 
behind the time the item was first sold the longest in the electrical equipment industry 
sector (335). However, recalls in the fabricated metal industry sector have the most 
counts of incidents.  



















recall_sum Design Incidents 
311 2 1 1.000 4.271 87.000 87.000 1.000 1.000 
322 2 2 1.000 8.430 467.500 467.500 0.000 1.000 
325 22 6 2.000 141.000 485.136 805.318 0.364 2.227 
332 8 4 1.500 150.000 652.375 652.375 0.500 82.125 
333 95 25 1.884 1270.000 1518.284 2746.568 0.387 59.547 
334 47 20 1.638 2500.000 1008.298 1784.681 0.511 18.830 
335 38 11 1.895 2460.000 2231.000 3172.263 0.270 17.789 
336 88 10 3.409 3060.000 594.449 1857.966 0.207 7.750 
337 27 8 2.259 608.000 1423.481 3127.741 0.385 9.778 
339 82 19 3.902 1300.000 749.561 2808.037 0.537 18.232 
Total 411 106 2.597 1770.000 1085.064 2352.027 0.383 25.333 
*In 100,000 dollars; +Industry definitions are given in Appendix B 
 
From Table 6, an average firm made almost three recalls in a year, with the maximum 
number of recalls during the study period for an individual firm is thirteen. About a 
third of all recalls are due design flaws and, on average, each recall is associated with 
23 incidents. 
     
Table 6 Descriptive statistics: Recall specific model 
variable mean sd min max 
recall 2.597 2.384 1.000 13.000 
Recall value* 1770.000 3230.000 0.000 18200.000 
time to recall_avg 1085.064 2798.369 26.000 39828.000 
time to recall_sum 2352.027 3420.750 26.000 39828.000 
design 0.383 0.404 0.000 1.000 
american 0.390 0.453 0.000 1.000 
incidents 25.333 129.588 0.000 2200.000 
*In 100,000 dollars  
5. Models and results 
This study the first model addressing Hypotheses 1 through 3, adapted nested fixed 




are nested in industry effects. This technique controls for both industry- and firm-
level effects. The assumption is that the association between the dependent variable, 
firm financial performance, and the major explanatory variable, recalls, includes 
random coefficients and random intercepts at the industry level (Han et al., 2012).  
All variables are standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1 except for 
the recall variable, to control for skewness and to reduce artificial collinearity, since 
second order variables are used in the estimation process. 
 
5.1. Global extensity and intensity, emerging market penetration 
intensity (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3) 
Table 7 provides the correlations between the variable pairs.  There is a positive 
correlation between recalls and profits and as expected a strong positive correlation 
between sales and profits. There is a surprising negative correlation between 
emerging market penetration and profits however, but the correlation between profits 
and the foreign sales ratio or global intensity is positive. However, 
internationalization, a measure of how spread or concentrated a firm is in terms of 






































                     
1 1.000                   
2 0.021 1.000                 
3 -0.029 -0.010 1.000               
4 -0.011 0.797 -0.016 1.000             
5 -0.047 -0.006 0.006 -0.010 1.000           
6 -0.040 -0.003 -0.024 -0.005 0.158 1.000         
7 -0.041 -0.005 -0.036 -0.009 0.846 0.152 1.000       
8 -0.018 -0.001 -0.013 -0.002 0.077 0.295 0.111 1.000     
9 0.350 -0.009 -0.035 -0.029 0.155 -0.001 0.158 0.017 1.000   
10 -0.057 0.006 -0.004 0.022 -0.142 -0.038 -0.135 -0.018 -0.368 1.000 
 
 
To reduce heteroscedasticity, all variables except the recall variable, are standardized. 
The estimations using fixed and random effects provide very similar results, so only 
the fixed coefficients random effects results are presented here
10
. Regression results 
for the fixed coefficients for all explanatory variables are presented in Table 8. 
Random coefficients of recalls and its squared term and global intensity at the 
industry level are presented in Table 9.  
 Four different sub models are estimated as presented in Table 8. The first 
three sub-models are estimated without the interaction terms. In sub-model 1, the 
recall value is excluded in the estimation. The recall value variable is included in the 
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Table 8: Regression results for nested fixed coefficients random effects Model (Hyp 










Capital intensity  -0.000(0.010)  -0.000(0.010) 0.000(0.011) 0(0.01) 
Inventory 0.115***(0.011) 0.114***(0.011) 0.112***(0.011) 0.114***(0.011) 
Inventory
2
  -0.004***(0.000)  -0.004***(0.000)  -0.004***(0.000)  -0.004***(0.000) 
Sales 0.832***(0.007) 0.834***(0.007) 0.841***(0.007) 0.832***(0.007) 
R&D intensity 0.000(0.011) 0.000(0.011)  -0.000(0.011) 0.000(0.02) 
Emerging market intensity  -0.019**(0.007)   -0.019**(0.007)  -0.020**(0.007)  -0.018**(0.007) 
Global sales intensity 0.025***(0.008) 0.026***(0.008) 0.024**(0.008) 0.024**(0.008) 
Internationalization  -0.020**(0.007)  -0.020**(0.007)  -0.021**(0.007)  -0.022**(0.007) 
Recall Value -  -0.038***(0.008)  -0.020**(0.008)  -0.038***(0.008) 
Recall 0.172***(0.030) 0.215***(0.031) - 0.388***(0.099) 
Recall
2
  -0.016***(0.004)  -0.019***(0.004) -  -0.091*(0.048) 
Recall*Emerging       0.124(0.272) 
Recall
2*
Emerging        -0.077(0.140) 
Recall*Global sales       0.128*(0.07) 
Recall
2
Global sales        -0.022(0.016) 
Recall*Internationalization       0.226***(0.07) 
Recall
2
Internationalization        -0.068**(0.021) 
Intercept 0.003(0.007)  -0.000(0.006) 0.009(0.007)  -0.001(0.006) 
Model Wald Chi-squared       1978 
Model probability (>Chi-
squared)       
0 
Likelihood ratio test vs. linear 
regression (Chisquared) 
      
508.93 
Probability (>LR Chi-squared)     0 




 has a highly significant Chi-squared score of 1978 (P<0.001). The 
likelihood ratio tests for the presence of random effects is also highly significant 
(508.93), indicating the existence of these random effects at industry and firm levels. 
 In all sub-models, the coefficient for the recall variable is positive and the 
coefficient for the recall squared variable is negative and both are highly significant 








(P<0.001).  These results support a curvilinear relationship between recalls and 
financial performance. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and suggests that profits 
may decline when recalls are either too high or too low. In Sub-model 1 in which the 
recall value is excluded, the recall and recall squared variable have positive and 
negative significant results respectively. This result is unchanged after adding the 
recall value which controls for the magnitude of the recalls. The results are therefore 
insensitive to recall magnitude or value. 
For the globalization variable, which is divided into global sales intensity and 
internalization intensity, the results are partially supported. The coefficient for the 
recall-global sales intensity interaction is positive and significant but the coefficient 
for the recall squared-global sales intensity is insignificant. This suggests that the 
relationship between recalls and profits is weaker with high global sales intensity. 
This is the opposite of expectations as suggested in Hypothesis 2. However, the 
coefficient for the interaction between recall and internationalization intensity (which 
measures the spread of a firm across international boundaries) is positive and 
significant and the recall squared-internationalization interaction coefficient is 
negative and significant. This suggests that the number of countries a firm depends on 
for it sales may influence the relationship between recalls and immediate financial 
performance. Since the recall squared-internationalization is negative and significant, 
this finding supports Hypothesis 2. In all, therefore, Hypothesis 2 is partially 
supported. The coefficients for the third set of interaction terms, the recall-emerging 
market penetration term as well as the recall squared-emerging market coefficient are 




 The coefficients for a number of control variables show expected signs. 
Inventory appears to have an inverted U-shaped relationship with performance in line 
with past literature. Sales are positively related to profits as expected. Most notably, 
the average recall value is negatively associated with financial performance. This 
means that the magnitude of a recall impacts profitability negatively. The coefficient 
for global sales intensity, that is, the ratio of foreign sales to total sales is positive and 
significant but the coefficient for internationalization which measures the 
concentration or dispersion of a firm’s sales across international boundaries is 
negative and significant. These suggest that global sales intensity is actually 
positively related to financial performance which has been found in prior studies. But 
internationalization or globalization in some literature, which measures the number of 
countries a company has sales in, is negatively associated with profits. This result is 
also consistent with past literature (example Lampell and Giachetti, 2013). Contrary 
to expectation however, the coefficient for emerging market penetration is negative
12
.    
 As given in Table 9, the relationship or association between recalls and profits 
varies across industries in the form of random slopes and random intercepts. Table 9 
gives the coefficients of the hypothesized variables for select industries; 6 out of the 
10 industries. Three of the six industries have positive and negative random 
coefficients for recall and recall-squared variables. These include computer and 
electronics sector (334), electrical equipment sector (335) and transportation 
equipment sector (336). In the machinery (333) and furniture (337) sectors, however, 
the first order coefficients are negative and both second order coefficients are 
                                                 
12





insignificant. Recalls in these industries would therefore, be associated with further 
negative financial performance. The influence of emerging market penetration, global 
intensity and global extensity also vary across industries. Emerging market 
penetration, for instance, worsens the negative association between recalls and profits 
in the machinery sector (333), but the opposite happens in the computer and 
electronics sector. 














 -0.090**   
(0.038) 
0.080*          
(0.047) 
0.065         
(0.108) 
 -0.108***  
(0.027 
 -0.101***    
(0.025) 
333 
 -0.037**  
(0.012) 
0.017     
(0.014) 
 -0.057*    
(0.030) 
0.014*   
(0.008) 
0.004             
(0.007) 
334 
0.192***   
(0.032) 




 -0.095***  
(0.029) 
0.382***       
(0.027) 
335 
0.019**    
(0.008) 
 -0.028**     
(0.009) 
 -0.008      
(0.011) 
0.002      
(0.006) 
 -0.003          
(0.003) 
336 
 -0.744***     
(2.517) 
 -0.047**      
(0.022) 
0.006        
(0.016) 
0.084***      
(0.013) 
0.006       
(0.016) 
337 
 -0.061*         
(0.036) 
0.471        
(0.510) 
 -0.002   
(0.011) 
 -0.115         
(0.161) 
 -0.006        
(0.032) 
*, **, and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels for two-tailed tests, respectively 
+ Full industry definitions are given in Appendix B. 
 
5.2. Sourcing structure; outsourcing, offshoring and supply base 
concentration (Hypotheses 4, 5, 6 and 7) 
Regression results of the moderating effects of sourcing structures on the association 
between financial performance and recalls are given in Table 10.  The model has a 




the presence of random effects is also highly significant (14.38), indicating the 
existence of these random effects at industry and firm levels. 
 The coefficient for the recall variable is positive and the coefficient for the 
recall-squared variable is negative and both are highly significant (P<0.001 and P<0.1 
respectively), reinforcing the suggestions from Model 1 that there is a curvilinear 
relationship between recalls and financial performance. Also, the peak of the 
relationship, assuming all other variables at their mean levels is two recalls which 
exactly matches that of Model 1. The recall outsourcing interaction coefficient is 
positive and significant at a reasonable significance level and the coefficient for the 
recall squared outsourcing interaction variable is negative and significant. Hypothesis 
4 which states the outsourcing intensity moderates the curvilinear relationship 
between recalls and profits is therefore supported. The recall-offshoring variable, 
unlike expectations, has a significant positive coefficient but the recall squared-profit 
interaction coefficient is insignificant. This is obviously an unexpected result 
suggesting that for firms sourcing more from abroad, the negative aspect of the 
association between recalls and profits is weaker. That is, such firms are able to delay 
to a higher recall when the negative effect kicks in. The recall-supplier concentration 
variable also has an insignificant coefficient. Hypothesis 6 is, therefore, not 
supported. The recall-national concentration variable, and all other recall squared 
interaction variables are insignificant. 
 A number of control variables have expected coefficients. Sales, R&D 
intensity both have positive coefficients and inventory has a positive coefficient and a 




Table 10: Regression results for model 2 (Hyp 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) 
Profit Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept  -0.048* 0.027 
Recall 0.290** 0.095 
Recall
2
  -0.071* 0.037 
Recall*outsourcing 1.073* 0.603 
Recall*Offshoring 0.135** 0.053 
Recall*Supplier concentration -1.529 1.206 
Recall*National concentration 0.429 1.709 
Recall
2
*Outsourcing  -0.626* 0.371 
Recall
2
*Offshoring 0.409 0.365 
Recall
2
*Supplier concentration 1.409 1.152 
Recall
2
*National Concentration -1.322 1.66 
Outsourcing -0.102 0.098 
Offshoring 0.145** 0.065 
Supplier concentration -0.084 0.089 
National concentration -0.019 0.057 
R&D intensity 0.164*** 0.033 
Capital intensity 0.025 0.023 
Sales 0.750*** 0.034 
Inventory 0.142*** 0.037 
Inventory
2
  -0.015* 0.009 









Probability (>LR Chi-squared) 0   
*, **, and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels for two-tailed tests, respectively 
 
 
5.3. Recall strategy and defect type model  
Regression results of Model 3, the recall strategy and defect type model is given in 
Table 11. Though weakly significant, the results on the recall-profit relationship is 
consistent with the other models. The interaction between average number of 




average time to recall and recalls interaction term is negative and significant.  The 
hypothesis that recall strategy may impact the recall profit relationship is therefore 
partially supported. The recall-design interaction has a negative significant 
coefficient. This supports the hypothesis, therefore, that design flaws that lead to 
recalls will exacerbate the negatively aspect of recalls on profits more than 
manufacturing problems. The coefficient for the squared recall interaction terms is 
only significant for average time to recall. This is explained later. 




Intercept 0.112 0.093 
Recall 0.096* 0.054 
Recall
2
  -0.021* 0.012 
Recall*Design -0.053* 0.032 
Recall*Time  -0.471* 0.254 
Recall
2
*Design 0.005 0.012 
Recall
2
*Time 0.090* 0.052 
Design 0.065 0.078 
Time 0.388* 0.208 
R&D intensity -0.058** 0.024 
Sales 0.880*** 0.024 
Capital intensity 0.028 0.027 
Inventory 0.125*** 0.028 
Inventory
2
  -0.026** 0.011 
Model Wald Chi-squared 645   
Model probability (>Chi-squared) 0   
Likelihood ratio test vs. linear regression (Chisquared) 108   
Probability (>LR Chi-squared) 0   






6.1. Global extensity and intensity, emerging market penetration 
intensity  
It is common knowledge that product recalls are on the rise and some academics have 
even suggested that recalls are here to stay (example Berman, 1999). For insight into 
the recall challenge, it is important to evaluate the immediate or short term impact of 
recalls on firms’ financial performance. This research explores the possibility of firms 
still being profitable, at some number of recalls, or, alternatively, the possibility that 
the impact of a recall is associated with minimal negative impact on financial 
performance. 
 First, a major contribution of this research is the suggestion that recalls, 
irrespective of the magnitude or the total value of items affected by a defect that 
prompts recalls, may actually be associated with higher financial performance. The 
implications are that the number of recalls made and the value or magnitude of the 
recall may actually be measuring two different things. The recall value obviously may 
be measuring the direct costs of the recall, that is, the reverse logistics costs of the 
recall. On the other hand, the recall itself may be a signal to the market. First, recalls 
could be a proxy for a firm’s explorative innovative activities such as venturing into 
new products. These activities may be associated with higher profits. Second, the 
implication is that avoiding some limited number of recalls involves high costs. This 
is shown by the initial positive slope of the recall-profit function. Successive recalls, 




performance negatively and lead to the suggested inverse U-shaped relationship 
between recalls and profits as illustrated I Fig. 2.  
 From Fig. 2, at the mean values of all other variables, profits peaks at 2 recalls 
per year. That is, controlling for the magnitude of the recalls, the optimal number of 
recalls is 2 recalls in a year. This peak however varies across firms depending on the 
intensity of their foreign sales as well as their extent of internationalization. This is 
illustrated below.  
Holding all other variables at their mean levels, global sales intensity tends to 
reinforce the initial positive relationship between recalls and profits extending the 
peak position of the profit. Even though this finding is contrary to the hypothesized 
relationship, it is not really that surprising. Global sales intensity can create 
operational slack (Huchzermeier and Cohen 1996; Allayannis et al., 2001) as argued 
in the hypothesis development. It turns out that the operational slack effect outweighs 
the complexity effect in moderating the recall performance relationship. This would 












Fig. 2: Recall profit relationship at mean values of other variables 





At the mean levels of global intensity, for instance, (that is the foreign sales ratio = 0), 
the peak profit coincides with 2 recalls.  
At high global sales intensity (global intensity = 1; one standard deviation above the 




At low global sales intensity (global intensity = -1; one standard deviation below the 
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These results imply that firms with a high global intensity would suffer less during a 
recall as compared to a firm with less global sales ratio. This moderating effect of 
global intensity is illustrated in Fig.3.  
 





This recall-profit relationship also varies across various levels of 
internationalization intensity as illustrated in Fig 4. As hypothesized, because of the 
complexities introduced by high internationalization, recalls and recovery may cost 
more. From Fig 4., at low internationalization levels, the recall-profit relationship is 
weaker and peaks at about 4 recalls. However, at high levels of internationalization, 









These associations or relationships also vary across industries. Fig. 5 
illustrates the recall-profit relationship in two different industries. Whereas the 
electrical equipment segment (335) shows some initial resilience by staying profitable 
above the mean with up to 1 standard deviation above the mean recalls, while the 
transportation equipment segment (336) displays a continuous negative association 
with recalls. A possible reason for this differential may be the hazard or risks 
associated with the use of products from each industry.  
 
 







6.2. Supply base structure; outsourcing, offshoring and supply base 
concentration  
The second set of moderators of interest on the recall-financial performance 
relationship is supply base structure. The popular media recently has insinuated that 
one reason for the spate of recalls is outsourcing and offshore outsourcing. In this 
essay, however, interest is not in causation of recalls, but rather in the possibility of 
worsening or alleviating any negative consequences of a recall.  
 Unexpectedly, both outsourcing and offshoring appears to assuage any 
negative association between recalls and profits and low levels of recalls. There are 
explanations for this unexpected result. The general public expectation, recently 
backed up by few academic researches results (e.g. Gray et al., 2011), is that products 
made by contract manufacturers abroad are of lower quality than products produced 
in the US. Consequently, a defect of an outsourced or off-shored product would not 




products. Therefore, the severity of the market reaction to a recall by a firm with high 
offshoring intensity would be less than those by a firm with lower offshoring 
intensity. Indeed, the regression results suggest that the expectation effect outweighs 
the costs of reverse logistics effect when there is a recall at low levels of recalls. 
However, at high levels of recalls, high outsourcing actually hurts the firm when there 
is a recall. This exactly matches expectations because of the longer supply chain in an 
outsourcing environment. Longer supply chain may mean higher reverse logistics 
costs during a recall through coordination difficulties, transportation costs for 
instance.   
6.3. Recall strategy and defect type 
The only recall specific variables found to significantly influence the recall-profit 
relationship are defect type and time to recall. That is, design defects that lead to 
recalls worsen the negative impact of recalls on performance. This differing 
association between recalls and profits across defect types is illustrated in Fig 6. 
Clearly from Fig 6, it can be seen that design errors are associated negatively 
with profits. However, firms are able to remain profitable with recalls when such 





Fig. 6: Recall profit relationship at -1, 0 and 1 standard deviation from the mean 















































 This research found two relationships between time to recall and financial 
performance; directly on profits and indirectly by influencing the recall profit 
relationship. The surprising finding that there is a positive relationship between time 
to recall and profits (the direct relationship)  perhaps partly answers the question 
academics have been asking for a while now; “why it takes so long to recall a 
defective product that poses a potential safety hazard?” (Roth et al., 2008; Trottman 
and Mitchell, 2010, Hora et al., 2011). However, time to recall tends to greatly 
moderate the curvilinear recall profit relationship. The study shows that firms that are 
proactive and make recalls sooner are able to maintain their profits at low recall rates 
and fimrs with mean time to recall have almost no effect of recalls on profits. 
However, firms with high time to recall are associated with a negative profit 
performance when there is a recall as illustrated in Figure 7. 
Fig 7: Recall profit relationship at -1, 0 and 1 standard deviation from the mean 






7. Implications and limitations 
7.1. Managerial Implications  
There are quite a few managerial implications of this study. First, the finding that few 
recalls may not necessarily be associated with negative financial performance is quite 
significant. The research suggests that if the magnitude of a recall is kept in check, a 
firm can remain profitable or even increase profits at as much as two recalls per year. 
This suggests optimization of defects as opposed to their elimination.  
 The study also points to the importance of diversifying the market base. High 
foreign sales are not only associated with high profits but also ameliorates any 
negative association between recalls and profits. Even though the direct effect is 
expected, the moderating influence on the recall-profit relationship is surprising given 




Offshoring or offshore outsourcing remains a popular strategy among 
manufacturing firms. Indeed, this study adds credence to this managerial practice by 
suggesting that not only does offshoring lead to higher profits, but surprisingly, 
reduces the negative association between recalls and profits. Outsourcing 
domestically on the other hand, is not found to have any association with profits 
directly neither does it influence the recall profit relationship.  
The finding that design related recalls hurt firms more is another important 
managerial implication of the research. Managers should therefore pay more attention 
to design problems and efforts should be directed to avoid such recalls.  
7.2. Research implications  
The major finding of the research, the non-linear association between recalls and 
profits is a novel and mind tickling result that may need corroborative findings in 
different industry settings. Further work is encouraged at either individual firm, 
industry or other industrial settings.  
 Another potential future research direction is the relationship between 
emerging markets and financial performance. Though not the main interest in this 
study, the finding here is that the relationship is negative contrary to some recent 
suggestions (example Han et al., 2012). This mixed findings present opportunities for 
further research that can add to our understanding of emerging market penetration and 
financial performance. 
This study also only looked at supply base concentration ignoring the length 
of the supply chain. There is the potential that the length of the supply chain also adds 




recalls and performance. Addition in this area could be an important contribution to 
the research stream.  
7.3. Limitations  
There are a few limitations to the study. First, data limitations restrict parts of the 
study to only a two-year time period. A study using a panel dataset may better allow 
for the investigation of causal factors. Second, our study is limited to publicly traded 
firms. A study that can include private firms is desired to add further insights to the 
subject area since a reasonable number of recalls are made by private firms. Third, the 
Bloomberg database used in parts of the study as source for key explanatory variables 
has data mainly on large firms.  Adding small firms to the analysis may improve the 











This dissertation is among the first and few comprehensive look at product recalls 
from a supply chain perspective. Despite the anecdotal evidence supported by few 
scholarly works that recalls affects firm financial performance many, industries 
including the consumer goods industry have seen increases in recalls in recent times. 
The spate of recalls within the last two decades has led to suggestions that recalls 
might just be here to stay (Berman, 1999). This study contributes to our 
understanding of product recalls by first investigating recall drivers from global 
supply chain perspective and then reexamining the association between recalls and 
profit margins.  
 In the first essay, the dissertation provides a theory-based explanation for and 
empirical evidence of lower quality in an outsourcing environment and consequently 
higher product recall events. Interesting moderation effects are also found that 
contributes to or are consistent with the agency theory perspective. For instance, 
theory suggests physical as well as cultural distances exist among countries and that 
these distances inhibit information flows. This study empirically suggests that these 
distances exacerbate the agency problem and thus offshore outsourcing is even more 
related to quality problems than inshore outsourcing. The study also implicitly found 
that high transactions costs in the form of coordination difficulties and transactions 
risk moderate the agency problem.    
 In the second essay, a mind tickling theoretical and empirical proposition is 




literature. Moreover, interesting moderation effects are found from global supply 
chain and recall management perspective.  
 Together, the two essays in this dissertation provide additional explanations 
for product recalls first in the form of supply chain strategies and second in the form 
of moderators of the effects of recalls on firm profits, all from supply chain lens. This 
study therefore adds an important strategic supply chain perspective to the theory of 
the firm. I hope it provides managers with a perspective to weigh the total costs of 
operations when exploring or deciding on the make or buy decision. I also hope it 
serves as a reference point for future research on broad quality implications of 































Appendix A; Excerpts from Bloomberg on the supply chain data 
 
Mathematically Derived Data.  
Bloomberg presently has hundreds of thousands of supply-chain relationships, and 
this number is growing daily. For each of these relationships, we determine how the 
product or service that is being sold is accounted for by the customer, and we put it 
into one (or more) of four “cost buckets”: COGS, CAPEX, R&D, and SG&A. Thus 
when INTC tells us in its 10-K that it receives 21% of its revenues from HPQ, we 
identify the fact that INTC is selling semiconductors to HPQ, and that HPQ accounts 
for these semiconductors as a COGS item on its income statement. We then multiply 
21% times INTC’s revenues and divide that by HPQ’s COGS, and derive that INTC 
represents 9.5% of HPQ’s COGS. This number, while proprietarily derived and 
currently unique to Bloomberg, is nevertheless factual, insofar as the number that 
INTC gives us (21%) is correct.  
Algorithmically Derived Data.  
Bloomberg has an algorithm that takes into account numerous types of data -- 
including but not limited to quantified and unquantified relationships, accounting 
types, financials, geographies, end markets, operating segments, products, channels, 
and a variety of industry data. We are then able to assign quantified values to 
relationships where no quantification is publicly known. Take, for example, AAPL 
and T. Many people know that T is a customer of AAPL, but neither AAPL nor T 




receives 5.11% of its revenues from T, and further that AAPL accounts for 9.49% of 
T’s COGS (at the time of this writing). Further, we plan to provide statistical 
confidence intervals to provide users the range for which we have high confidence in 
which this single-point estimate resides. 
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